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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, DEMOCRATIC NORMS,
AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE
52 EMORY L.J. 187 (2003)
Dawn C. Nunziato*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a decade, the Internet has transformed from an
obscure medium for the exchange of military and scientific data to
a global medium of mass communication and expression of all
kinds. As speech on the Internet has become increasingly
important, a number of governments have made well-publicized
and widely criticized attempts to control it. Not as well-publicized
or as well-analyzed are the speech-regarding policies of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or ICANN,
the body that has been governing the Internet’s infrastructure for
the last five years. In the agreement under which it gained its
current powers, ICANN assured the United States that it would
govern the Internet’s infrastructure democratically and would
implement governance structures to take into account the interests
of affected Internet users around the world. In particular, ICANN
promised to conduct worldwide elections of representatives to its
*
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decision-making bodies and to embody deliberative and
representative democratic structures.
While ICANN has
acknowledged the importance of implementing such procedural
democratic norms, it has failed to acknowledge that the ideals of
democratic governance encompass substantive norms, such as
protection for freedom of expression.
Nor has ICANN
acknowledged that any of its policies implicate free speech.
In this Article, I challenge both components of the
prevailing ideology -- that ICANN’s governance of the Internet’s
infrastructure does not threaten free speech and (relatedly) that
ICANN’s governance of the Internet need not embody special
protections for free speech.
I argue that ICANN’s decisionmaking authority over the Internet’s infrastructure indeed
encompasses the power to enact regulations affecting speech
within the most powerful forum for expression ever developed.
Specifically, current ICANN policies restrict the ability to engage
in anonymous speech and critical speech on the Internet. I claim
that ICANN cannot remain true to the democratic norms it was
designed to embody unless it adopts policies to protect substantive
values integral to democracy – including protections for freedom
of expression.
This inquiry into ICANN’s governance structure, and the
values such structure should embody, is particularly timely. The
United States government is in the midst of evaluating how well
ICANN has lived up to its initial commitments to embody
democratic decision-making structures as it considers whether to
renew its agreement with ICANN to permit ICANN to continue its
role in governing the Internet’s infrastructure. At the same time,
ICANN has been engaged in a process of internal scrutiny and
self-evaluation and has proposed to reform its governance
structure as it attempts to learn from its experience in developing a
global representative decision-making body responsible for
governing the Internet’s infrastructure.
Although ICANN’s
impetus for self-evaluation and reform is commendable, after
analyzing these proposed reforms, I conclude that the reforms of
its governance structure proposed by ICANN will render it less
able to embody the norms of liberal democracy and less capable of
protecting individuals’ fundamental rights. I contend that unless
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ICANN reforms its governance structure to render it consistent
with the procedural and substantive norms of democracy
articulated herein, ICANN should be stripped of its decisionmaking authority over the Internet’s infrastructure.
It is now well understood that the Internet constitutes a
forum for free expression of unprecedented scope and breadth. As
I briefly set forth in Part II(A), the low barriers to this market for
speech and its global reach render the Internet the most powerful
vehicle for expression ever developed. When governments seek to
control speech within this forum, the global Internet community
has viewed such attempts with justified suspicion and scrutiny.
Less well-understood and less carefully scrutinized are the
measures that ICANN has undertaken that implicate expression on
the Internet. Because ICANN’s policy-making, both actual and
potential, implicating the right to free speech on the Internet is not
readily apparent, in Part II(B) I review ICANN’s control over the
Internet’s infrastructure and explore two significant ways in which
ICANN is responsible for developing speech-regarding policies for
the Internet. First, ICANN has exercised its authority over the
Internet’s infrastructure to establish a (mandatory) policy that
essentially prohibits websites from being maintained
anonymously.
This policy erects substantial barriers to
individuals’ ability to engage in anonymous speech on the Internet,
which is a significant component of the right to freedom of
expression. Second, ICANN has established a (mandatory) policy
for adjudicating disputes between intellectual property owners and
domain name holders that restricts Internet users’ ability to engage
in critical speech on the Internet. Each of these policies impacts
Internet users’ right to free speech in subtle but significant ways.
In so regulating speech within this important expressive forum,
ICANN serves a significant public ordering function with respect
to speech on the Internet. As the functional equivalent of a public
actor, ICANN should be held to the normative ideals of democracy
– both procedural and substantive -- that we generally require only
of governments.
In Part III, I set forth my conception of the normative
ideals of liberal democracy with an eye toward how these ideals
should be implemented in the context of Internet governance.
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While democracy simpliciter requires political equality among
citizens (generally implemented in large-scale democracies
through the device of representation), liberal democracy requires
in addition that certain substantive protections be implemented
within the government’s structure to protect individuals’
fundamental rights. Such substantive protections are typically
enshrined through mechanisms of higher-order law-making like
constitutions, along with their requisite enforcement mechanisms,
like independent judicial review. Thus, while liberal democracies
incorporate processes to reflect the will of the people and to render
them accountable to the people, they also implement meaningful
protections for certain substantive rights. As I explain in Part
III(B), procedural democratic theorists are generally loathe to
enshrine protections for substantive rights or to prescribe the
outcomes of well-designed democratic processes. Yet, even
procedurally-inclined theorists acknowledge that certain
substantive rights – including the right to freedom of expression –
must be accorded special protections within democratic societies
because such rights are integral to the process of self-government
itself.
In Part IV, I examine the essential features of ICANN’s
(initial and revised) governance structure in order to assess the
extent to which this structure embodies the normative ideals of
liberal democracy. I contend that while ICANN’s framers initially
(dimly) appreciated the important public ordering role it would
come to serve in regulating certain Internet conduct, they went
only part of the way toward embodying the requisite normative
ideals of liberal democracy within ICANN’s governance structure.
Although ICANN’s framers committed ICANN to procedural
democratic norms by essentially designing ICANN as a
representative democratic institution, they failed to understand or
predict the significant public ordering role ICANN would serve in
regulating speech on the Internet. As a result, they failed to
commit ICANN to substantive normative ideals integral to liberal
democracy -- most importantly, the protection of freedom of
expression. ICANN has recently undertaken the revision of its
initial governance structure in an attempt to learn from its
experience over the past five years. These revisions, however,
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mark a retreat from its initial commitment to embody the
procedural ideals of liberal democracy.
In particular, these
proposed revisions to ICANN’s governance structure (1) abandon
ICANN’s earlier commitment to direct elections by Internet users
of ICANN’s governing body, and (2) render essentially
meaningless ICANN’s earlier commitment to independent review
of its decision-making. Furthermore, such revisions in no way
incorporate substantive ideals of liberal democracy – such as
special protection for freedom of expression -- within ICANN’s
governance structure. As such, ICANN’s proposed reforms of its
governance structure represent a step in the wrong direction.
In Part V, I provide concrete recommendations for ICANN
to implement meaningful protections for freedom of expression.
In so doing, I look for guidance to the general themes and
principles embodied within the United States’ First Amendment
jurisprudence. Although I do not claim that ICANN is technically
a “state actor” for purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence, nor
that ICANN should necessarily embody the substantive
democratic norm of freedom of expression in the same fashion as
the United States does, I do claim that important themes can be
elicited from the United States’ experience of protecting freedom
of expression within a liberal democracy.
First, the United States’ experience teaches that special
protections for free speech beyond those embodied within
procedural democratic norms themselves are necessary, and that
merely embodying procedural democratic norms of ensuring
political equality will not necessarily suffice to secure this
fundamental right. Second, the United States experience teaches
that, in order to be meaningful, protection for free speech must
ultimately be reposited in an independent judicial body. Third,
First Amendment jurisprudence teaches that governments must
ensure that any policies restricting speech advance important,
articulated purposes in the least speech-restrictive manner
possible. Finally, First Amendment jurisprudence accords special
protections for certain types of speech that are particularly
vulnerable within democracies – namely countermajoritarian
speech or speech embodying characteristics that render it
otherwise vulnerable within a democracy that merely reflects the
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will of the majority.
The United States protects
countermajoritarian speech in two ways that are relevant for
ICANN.
First Amendment jurisprudence grants special
protections for anonymous speech and critical speech, each of
which serves as an important vehicle for the expression of
unpopular or dissident ideas and viewpoints.
The First
Amendment extends protections for such speech even within the
context of competing claims by intellectual property holders that
such speech infringes their intellectual property rights. An
important function of intellectual property law within liberal
democracies is to prevent intellectual property owners from
exercising unlimited monopoly control over components of the
common language or culture. Accordingly, U.S. intellectual
property law reflects a nuanced working out of the ways in which
to protect free speech values against overreaching by intellectual
property owners. Although I do not claim that free speech values
must be protected on the Internet by ICANN in precisely the same
way that they are protected by United States courts, I contend that
these First Amendment themes and principles are illuminative for
ICANN as it goes about revising its policies to incorporate the
liberal democratic norm of freedom of expression.
Toward this end, I propose several ways in which ICANN
should revise its policies to accord meaningful protection for
freedom of expression. First, ICANN should revise its policies
requiring the disclosure and publication of Internet users’ personal
information, including name and address, as a prerequisite for
maintaining a website. Second, ICANN should revise its policy
applying to the resolution of disputes between trademark owners
and domain name holders to incorporate meaningful protections
for the right to engage in critical speech. Finally, in order to hold
in check ICANN’s power to enact policies that are insufficiently
protective of free speech, ICANN should render meaningful its
initial promise to constitute an Independent Review Panel
responsible for evaluating ICANN policy-making for adherence to
the procedural and substantive commitments articulated in its
foundational documents.
II.

THE INTERNET CORPORATION

FOR

ASSIGNED
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NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN) AND ITS DECISIONMAKING AFFECTING FREE SPEECH
Five years ago, the United States ceded responsibility for
regulating key elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN
– a private entity essentially unaffiliated1 with any pre-existing
territorial government or international governance entity, yet one
essentially designed to perform certain of the functions of
(democratic) government. In particular, ICANN’s governance
structure was designed to reflect and account for the preferences
of Internet users throughout the world in developing policies that
would affect the interests of Internet users worldwide.2 When
ceding this control, the United States and other framers of ICANN
did not realize (or acknowledge) that ICANN’s control over the
Internet’s infrastructure would extend to controlling speech on the
Internet. Accordingly, they did not require special protections for
freedom of expression as a condition for transferring control over
the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN. Today, however, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that ICANN’s control over the
1

Of course, as discussed infra, ICANN was summoned into being by and
received its authority from the United States government. Further, its
continued exercise of this authority is subject to the approval of the U.S.
government. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using
ICANN
to
Route
Around
the
APA
and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 20 (2000). And, ICANN was
technically formed as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the State
of California and is therefore subject to this state’s laws. Id. Despite
these formal affiliations, ICANN was fundamentally designed to be a
global decision-making entity operating independently of existing
territorial sovereigns, as I explain infra. See text accompanying notes
178-219.
2
See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and The Problem of Legitimacy,
50 DUKE L. J. 187, 215-16 (2000) (describing ICANN as a “private
entity seeking to play the sort of role more commonly played in our
society by public entities, [i.e.,] setting rules for an international
communications medium of surpassing importance, [which] has
historically been performed at the behest of the U.S. government and had
been conducted in an explicitly public-regarding manner.”)
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Internet’s infrastructure encompasses the power to enact policies
affecting speech.
Within the past decade, speakers and listeners throughout
the world have begun to appreciate the value of the Internet as a
forum for free expression. Once the limitations on the permissible
uses of the Internet were lifted and the Internet was opened up as a
forum for expression of all kinds,3 speakers and publishers from
all walks of life from every corner of the world flocked to the
Internet.4 Governments, recognizing the Internet’s potential as a
lens through which putative speech harms could be magnified,
have undertaken extensive measures to censor and control speech
over the Internet.5 While such governmental attempts to restrict
the free flow of expression have been roundly criticized,6 the
speech-restrictive policies of ICANN have largely escaped notice
and criticism.
ICANN regulates speech on the Internet in two subtle but
significant ways. First, ICANN enjoys the power to establish
rules governing the registration of domain names -- the names
assigned to computers that form part of the Internet, such as
7
8
AMAZON.COM,
FUCKGENERALMOTORS.COM,
9
10
ABORTIONISMURDER.COM, and HATEISNOTAFAMILYVALUE.COM.
This power to establish prerequisites for the registration of domain
names translates into the power to establish prerequisites for
maintaining websites. ICANN has exercised this power in such a
way as to prohibit Internet users from maintaining websites
3

See MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, 63 Fed.
Reg. 31,741 n.5 (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm (explaining that in 1992, the United States
Congress granted the National Science Foundation the statutory authority
to allow commercial activity on what was to become the Internet).
4
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
5
See text accompanying notes 18-21.
6
See text accompanying notes 22-23.
7
See http://www.amazon.com.
8
See http://www.fuckgeneralmotors.com.
9
See http:/www.abortionismurder.com.
10
See http://www.hateisnotafamilyvalue.com.
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anonymously or pseudonymously. According to ICANN policy,
in order to register a domain name and maintain a website,
individuals must reveal their name, address, and other personal
contact information to their domain name registrar.11 ICANN
further requires that domain name registrars make such
information about the identity of domain name holders publicly
available, thereby restricting the opportunity to engage in
anonymous speech on the Internet. Second, ICANN has enacted a
mandatory policy – the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy – that
enables trademark owners to compel domain name holders to
surrender domain names critical of trademark owners. This policy
takes into account both the expressive content embodied within
the domain name itself (such as GWBUSHSUCKS.COM and
TOYOTASUCKS.COM) and the content made available on the
website maintained under that domain name. In this Part, I first
briefly review the Internet’s development into an important forum
for free expression. I then set forth the basis and scope of
ICANN’s power to regulate speech on the Internet. Finally, I
explore how ICANN has exercised this power in ways that
implicate free speech on the Internet.
A. Free Speech as a Constitutive Good of the Internet
It is now widely recognized that the Internet constitutes a
uniquely valuable forum for individuals to express themselves and
communicate with one another on a global scale. As one court
explained, “It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has
achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
marketplace of mass speech that this country – and indeed the
world – has yet seen.”12 Several features constitutive of today’s
Internet13 render it a uniquely powerful vehicle for speakers and
11

See text accompanying notes 49-60.
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117
S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
13
This is not to say that the inherent nature of the Internet presumes such
features. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999) (arguing against an essentialist conception of the
Internet’s “nature”).
12
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publishers to express themselves to worldwide audiences at very
low cost.14 For the (very low) cost of establishing a website, an
individual can express herself in the context of a whole host of
mediums -- text, images, audio, video – to a virtually unlimited
array of listeners. The barriers to entry that exist in other media,
such as traditional print publication and broadcast media, are
drastically reduced in the context of the Internet. The ability to
speak or publish via the Internet is not accompanied by enormous
barriers to entry that are present in connection with expressing
oneself via traditional print media, such as newspapers or
periodicals.15 In contrast to traditional broadcast media, where the
ability to express oneself widely is constrained by substantial
licensing requirements and associated fees, the Internet is not
shackled by spectrum scarcity, by the onerous licensing
requirements or fees necessitated by a limited broadcast spectrum,
nor by the high cost of entry into this marketplace for expression.
As a result, the Internet – to a much greater extent than traditional
mediums of expression – facilitates a true marketplace of ideas,
one that is not dominated by the few wealthy voices who are able
to express themselves effectively via traditional print or broadcast
media.16 Because of the Internet’s combination of such speechfriendly features:
Individual citizens of limited means can speak to a
worldwide audience on issues of concern to them.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists may debate the structure
of their government nightly, but these debates occur in
newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets.
Modern-day Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic
bulletin boards rather than the door of the Wittenberg
Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a constitutional
14

See 929 F. Supp. at 877 (explaining that as a result of the Internet’s
“very low barriers to entry,” “astoundingly diverse content is available
on the Internet,” which now constitutes “a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication.”)
15
Id.
16
Id. at 880.
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perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between
aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly
fishermen.17
Recognizing the Internet’s unprecedented capacity as a
forum for expression, many entities have attempted to censor
Internet speech that they view as dangerous. Governments
throughout the world have sought to control speech on the Internet
that they believe may harm their citizens. Liberal Western
democracies have attempted, with limited success,18 to censor
speech that they believe to be harmful to children,19 obscene as to
minors, or hateful to particular groups.20 Eastern regimes have
attempted to restrict the flow of expression that challenges their
way of governing or their way of life.21 These governmental
17

Id. at 881.
See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human Right to
Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at http://www.gilc.org
(detailing means by which Western democracies have attempted to
censor speech on the Internet, including by criminalizing certain types of
speech on the Internet, imposing content-based licensing restrictions on
Internet Service Providers, and compelling the use of filtering, rating, or
content labeling tools).
19
The United States, for example, has repeatedly sought to regulate
pornographic and child pornographic content on the Internet, with little
success. See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct.
2329 (1997) (striking down portions of Communications Decency Act of
1995); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, ___ U.S. ___ (2002) (striking
down Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996).
20
France, for example, has attempted to regulate the display of Nazi
memorabilia on the Internet, including in cases where such content is
hosted by servers located outside of France. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N. D.
Cal. 2001).
21
China, for example, blocks access to foreign sites (such as The
Washington Post and The New York Times) that it believes threaten its
way of life, and has recently begun blocking access to certain popular
search engines (such as Google and Altavista). See Peter S. Goodman &
Mike Musgrove, China Blocks Web Search Engines, The Washington
Post, September 12, 2002, at E1.
18
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attempts to control and censor Internet expression have been the
subject of widespread global criticism and rebuke.22 Emerging
from our collective experience with confronting attempts at
Internet censorship is the widely-shared democratic value that
expression on the Internet should be “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open”23 and that protecting freedom of expression on the
Internet is of pre-eminent importance.
While governmental attempts to restrict Internet expression
have properly been subject to intense scrutiny by the Internet
community at large,24 similar efforts by non-governmental actors
or non-traditional government actors – such as ICANN’s subtler
efforts to restrict Internet expression – have received little
attention or scrutiny. In Parts II(C) and (D), I articulate the ways
in which ICANN’s policies restrict expression on the Internet. In
Part II(B), I examine ICANN’s power over the Internet’s
infrastructure and how such power has translated into the limited
power to control expression on the Internet.
B. The Basis and Scope of ICANN’s Power to Regulate Speech on
the Internet
ICANN’s power to enact policies affecting speech on the
22

See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human Right to
Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at http://www.gilc.org
(contending that “attempts to suppress information and communication
on the Internet violate various international human rights laws,”
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; European Convention of Human
Rights; Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information;
Charter of Paris for a New Europe; American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man & the American Convention on Human Rights; and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.)

23

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See, e.g., Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human
Right to Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at
http://www.gilc.org (documenting widespread international criticism of
governmental attempts to suppress expression on the Internet).

24
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Internet is grounded in its power over the Domain Name System.
Domain names are the familiar and easily-remembered addresses
for computers that form part of the Internet (such as
25
26
TRAVELOCITY.COM,
BOBDYLAN.COM,
and PROCHOICE.COM27).
Domain names, in turn, map to Internet Protocol (IP) numbers,
which serve as routing addresses for computers on the Internet.
The Domain Name System is the system that manages the
allocation of domain names and that translates domain names into
IP numbers so as to make possible the transmission of information
across the Internet.28
When the United States ceded control over the Internet’s
infrastructure to ICANN,29 one of the most important functions it
transferred was control over the Domain Name System. ICANN’s
control over the Domain Name System, in turn, encompasses the
ability to enact policies regulating the acquisition and maintenance
of domain names and hence regulating of the acquisition and
maintenance of websites. Accordingly, such control over the
Domain Name System translates into control over speech on the
Internet.
ICANN’s power to regulate speech on the Internet in this
way is not derived from a statutory or treaty-based exclusive right
to administer the Domain Name System,30 but rather from its
control over the set of computers that form the core of the Domain
Name System as we know it. The set of computers that ICANN
controls are known as the “root server” and consist of a number of
25

See http://www.travelocity.com.
See http://www.bobdylan.com.
27
See http:/www.prochoice.com.
28
See MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, 63 Fed.
Reg. 31,741 (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
29
See text accompanying notes 165-92.
30
Indeed, as I discuss infra at text accompanying notes 42-44, there are
several other organizations – although insignificant in comparison to
ICANN -- that run domain name systems and assign domain names.
See, e.g., AlterNIC, Inc., at http://alternic.net; The Internet Namespace
Cooperative, at http://www.tinc-org.com; New.net, at http://www.new.net; and Newroot, at http://www.newroot.com.
26
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computers with identical contents spread over several continents.
The United States Department of Commerce, which itself acquired
control of the root server from the Department of Defense as part
of the transformation of the Internet from a military network to a
civilian one, granted ICANN control over the root server32 in 1998
via a Memorandum of Understanding that it entered into with
ICANN.33 In Part IV, I explore the circumstances under which the
United States agreed to transfer such control to ICANN. In this
Part, I focus on the contours of the control that was transferred and
the ways in which ICANN’s technical control over the root server
and the Domain Name System has transformed into control over
expression on the Internet.
As its name suggests, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers assigns not only names – domain
names, like ASHCROFTLIED.COM34 and FUCKOSAMA.COM35 – but
also numbers – Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, like
128.164.132.16.36 IP addresses form the primary address system
31

There are currently 13 root servers. See http://www.icann.org/
committees/dns-root/y2k-statement.htm. Technical guidelines for
operation of the root servers may be found in RFC 2870. See
http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/rfc2870.txt.
32
“Control” is simply physical control of the computers, as enforced by
the law of trespass and by federal laws against computer fraud and
hacking. For example, when Eugene Kashpureff, the founder of
AlterNIC, hacked into the website of Network Solutions, Inc., which was
then operating the root server, and diverted traffic from its website to
AlterNIC’s for several days in June 1997, he was extradited from Canada
and pled guilty to violations of a federal computer fraud law. See
Domain Name Guerilla Kashpureff Gets Off Lightly, NETWORK WEEK,
August 7, 1998, at http://www.newslinx.com/News/August/cg080798c.html.
33
See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (Nov. 25, 1998), at
http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm
[hereinafter
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING].
34
See http://www.ashcroftlied.com.
35
See http://www.fuckosama.com.
36
ICANN delegates the responsibility of assigning IP addresses to three

14
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of the Internet, which enable information to be routed from one
computer to another across many intermediate computers and the
links between them. Each computer linked to the (public) Internet
must have a unique IP address in order for information to be
routed correctly between computers.37 Although the Internet
could, as a technical matter, function with numerical IP addresses
alone, there are certain advantages to layering a name system on
top of the numbering system. First, human beings can use and
remember letters and words (like STOPTHEWAR.COM) more easily
than long strings of numbers (like the IP addresses that correspond
to these domain names, such as 128.164.132.16).38 The Domain
regional registries: the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
(APNIC), http://www.apnic.net; the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (ARIN), http://www.arin.net; and the Réseaux IP Européens
Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), http://www.ripe.net. Those
regional registries in turn assign numbers to entities that can demonstrate
a need for a large block of numbers, such as commercial Internet Service
Providers or large companies.
37
To be precise, first, it is each “interface” that must have a unique IP
address. Internet “host” computers (computers that run the applications
that make the Internet useful to end-users, like web browsers and servers
and e-mail clients and servers) need only one interface, as they are the
sources or final destinations of Internet transmissions. Routers and
switches (computers that route information between host computers)
need more than one interface, and hence need more than one IP address.
Second, host computers can have “dynamic” IP addresses, which are
assigned only for a temporary period, such as a single session using a
dial-up modem to connect to an Internet Service Provider, as well as
“static” IP addresses, which are assigned for a longer period. Third,
many computers on a local network can share a single connection to the
public Internet, as methods are available for keeping each local
computer’s use of the shared connection distinct. That said, it is still the
case that, at any one time, a computer using the Internet needs to be
using some unique IP address to ensure correct routing.
38
In addition, since many more trademarks are made up of words and
other combinations of letters than of numbers, the branding of Internet
destinations is easier with a word-based system. Finally, a dual address
system allows websites to keep the same names even if their IP addresses
change (or even if the entire IP numbering system changes), which
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Name System now administered by ICANN and coordinated at a
technical level through its root server is the primary system for
providing a name-based addressing system that makes possible the
transmission of information across the network of computers that
make up the Internet.
The ICANN-run Domain Name System thus consists of a
set of computers for storing top-level domain name information,
as well as a protocol for translating (or “resolving”) domain names
to IP addresses. Every time an Internet user requests a website or
sends an e-mail using a domain name, the first step her computer
takes is to send a message requesting the IP address corresponding
to that domain name. Only after obtaining the IP address does the
computer actually retrieve the page or send the e-mail, marking its
destination with the IP address.
The ICANN root servers are at the core of the Domain
Name System run by ICANN. Although the root servers do not
themselves store all of the domain name/IP address matches, they
keep track of other computers that do, and route requests for IP
address matches onto those computers. Thus, if ICANN wishes to
terminate or reassign a domain name, it simply changes the
information on its own computers, or requires others who own
computers with that information to change it, upon threat of
ceasing to route IP address requests to those computers. The
ICANN-run Domain Name System currently encompasses about
245 “top-level domains,”39 including 13 “generic top-level
provides useful stability for the Internet’s end-users.
39
Each one of these top-level domains is administered by a separate
organization, and ICANN exercises varying degrees of control over the
policies of these organizations. Generally, the most closely controlled of
these organizations are those administering the nine generic top-level
domains subject to registrar competition, namely, .COM, .NET, .ORG,
.INFO, .BIZ., .AERO, .MUSEUM, .COOP, and .NAME. These are soon to be
joined by .PRO. See http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm. The top-level
domains that are not generally open to the public and are not subject to
registrar competition are .EDU, .MIL, .GOV, and .INT. See id. ICANN
has entered into detailed registry agreements with each of these
organizations. See, e.g., .COM Registry Agreement Between ICANN and
Verisign, Inc., at http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/-com-
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domains” (gTLDs), such as .COM, .ORG, .EDU, .INFO, and .AERO,
and about 230 “country-code top-level domains” (ccTLDs), such
as .UK (United Kingdom) and .TV (Tuvalu).41 In other words, the
ICANN root servers will route requests for IP addresses
corresponding to any domain name ending in one of these toplevel domains.
ICANN has no legal monopoly on running the Domain
Name System, and several other organizations have in fact set up
alternative domain name systems, running on alternative name
server computers.42 If and to the extent that competitor domain
name systems are able to make inroads into ICANN’s market,
such competition in the market for domain name related policies
will render the policy choices made by ICANN less significant.
On the Internet as in real space, meaningful competition with
respect to policy choices arguably provides some protection for
individual rights, since individuals to some extent can protect
their rights via the mechanism of exit.43 At present, however, the
index.htm. In addition, ICANN has accredited other companies as
independent registrars for these top-level domains, and has entered into
registrar accreditation agreements with each of them. The current list of
ICANN-accredited registrars is available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html.
The current Registrar Accreditation
Agreement is available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement17may01.htm. These are also the most popular top-level domains.
ICANN exercises somewhat looser control over the country-code toplevel domains (ccTLDs), in part out of deference to local cultures and
governments. Nonetheless, many ccTLD administrators voluntarily
adhere to ICANN policies, including the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy, discussed infra in Part II(C).
40
The current list of generic top level domains is available at
http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm.
41
The current list of country code top level domains is available at
http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm.
42
See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy – Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 n.34
(2002) (describing alternate domain name servers and ability to access
alternate top level domains).
43
David Johnson and David Post, for example, contend that:
The separation of subsidiary "territories" or spheres of activity

17

Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance
18
alternative domain name systems and the alternative Top Level
Domains (TLDs) they administer cannot be said to constitute
meaningful competition for ICANN, and such systems are
unlikely to gain appreciable market share in the near term.
Virtually all Internet Service Providers provide domain name
service that is part of the ICANN-run system. Every computer
configured to connect to the Internet through one of those
services is initially set up to use the ICANN-controlled Domain
Name System. To surf the web using alternative top-level
domains (such as .free or .ltd), one must reset one’s network
settings or modify one’s browser software, and must be willing to
trust name server computers that are not nearly as wellestablished or numerous as those within the ICANN-run system.
Very few Internet users are willing (or able) to take these steps.
As Michael Froomkin explains:
within Cyberspace ... allow[s] for the development of distinct
rule sets and for the divergence of those rule sets over time ....
Content or conduct acceptable in one "area" of the Net may be
banned in another . . . . [As compared to real space, in
cyberspace] any given user has a more accessible exit option, in
terms of moving from one virtual environment's rule set to
another's . . . .
David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1397 (1996). Johnson and Post
contend that top-down regulation to protect individuals’ rights is
unnecessary within such a model of cyberspace because different market
actors will tend to produce a wide and divergent range of policy- or rulesets, embodying different value choices (some consistent with the First
Amendment, for example, others not). Such divergent policy-sets will
provide users the freedom to choose which policy-set best accords with
their preferences and values. I have elsewhere questioned Johnson and
Post’s implicit contention that fundamental individual rights can be
adequately protected merely by virtue of a “market” in policy-sets. See
Dawn C. Nunziato, Exit, Voice, and Values on the ‘Net, 15 BERK. TECH.
L. J. 753 (2000). Because in any case no meaningful competition to
ICANN’s domain name policy-making exists, an inquiry into how well
ICANN’s policy-making protects fundamental individual rights is
warranted.
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Although there is no technical obstacle to anyone
maintaining a TLD that is not listed in [ICANN’s root
server or the “legacy root”], these “alternate” TLDs can
only be resolved by users whose machines, or Internet
service providers (ISPs) as the case may be, use a domain
name server that includes this additional data or knows
where to find it. A combination of consensus, lack of
knowledge, and inertia among the people running the
machines that administer domain name lookups means
that domain names in TLDs outside the legacy root . . .
cannot be accessed by the large majority of people who
use the Internet, unless they do some tinkering with
obscure parts of their browser settings.44
As a result, anyone who wishes to communicate broadly
on the Internet using a domain name, whether by establishing or
accessing a website or by obtaining or using an e-mail address,
will likely be hesitant to use an alternative top-level domain not
supported by the ICANN Domain Name System. Because the
ICANN-run Domain Name System is likely to dominate in the
foreseeable future,45 an inquiry into ICANN’s policy choices
affecting Internet users’ rights is warranted.
C. ICANN’s Decision-Making Implicating Anonymous Speech on
the Internet
When the United States transferred control over the
Domain Name System to ICANN, it also conveyed to ICANN the
concomitant power to enact regulations affecting the registration
and maintenance of domain names. ICANN’s power over the
registration and maintenance of domain names has transformed
44

Froomkin, supra note 1, at 42. See also Weinberg, supra note 2, at
198 (“Very few Internet users . . . look to alternative root servers. The
vast majority rely on the single set of [ICANN-controlled] authoritative
root servers . . . that have achieved canonical status.)
45
For its part, ICANN formally opposes the creation of alternative
domain name systems, citing the benefits of “universal resolvability.”
See http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html.
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into the power to enact regulations affecting the registration and
maintenance of websites. As part of ICANN’s power to regulate
the Domain Name System, ICANN has established a set of
foundational requirements that must be adhered to by anyone
wishing to register and maintain a domain name.
Because
registering a domain name is a prerequisite to establishing a
website, the preconditions ICANN establishes for registering a
domain name translate into preconditions for obtaining and
maintaining an Internet website. Maintaining an Internet website,
in turn, is one of the most powerful vehicles of expression on the
Internet, and indeed is becoming one of the most powerful vehicles
of expression available within any forum.46 Accordingly,
ICANN’s power to establish preconditions for registering domain
names – and hence for websites -- translates into the power to
establish prerequisites for engaging in an important form of
expression. And, as I discuss infra, no meaningful checks exist on
ICANN’s power to establish such mandatory pre-requisites.47
In exercising this power thus far, ICANN has established a
set of foundational requirements that prohibit domain names from
being registered -- and hence websites from being maintained -anonymously (or pseudonymously). While participation in many
types of Internet communications and transactions – such as email,
online discussion groups, chat rooms, etc. – can take place
anonymously (or pseudonymously),48 dissemination of content via
a website cannot. This is because ICANN has established a policy
mandating that anyone wishing to register a domain name first
must provide, for public consumption,49 certain personal contact
46

See Part II(A) supra.
See text accompanying notes 220-27.
48
For example, Microsoft’s e-mail (Hotmail) and messenger (MSN
Messenger) services allow their users to remain anonymous or
pseudonymous.
See
MSN
Statement
of
Privacy,
at
http://privacy.msn.com/default.asp#MSNGR. MSN will only disclose a
user’s identity if ordered to do so by law. See id. America Online’s
Instant Messenger™ privacy policy provides similar safeguards for the
privacy of Internet users’ identities.
See Privacy Policy, at
http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.html.
49
See text accompanying notes 58-60.
47
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information. At the behest of interested intellectual property
owners,50 who were concerned about their ability to police
infringing content on the Internet, ICANN enacted a policy that
requires those registering and maintaining a website to disclose to
the public their name, address, and other contact information. This
mandatory ICANN policy, which ICANN implements through its
contracts with domain name registries and registrars,51 requires
that anyone wishing to acquire the right to use a domain name –
which, in turn, is the prerequisite to publishing content on the
Internet52 – first provide truthful and accurate contact information
to her domain name registrar, including her full name and mailing
address.53 Thus, for example, one wishing to establish the domain
50

The Intellectual Property Constituency, an interest group constituency
within ICANN’s Domain Name Supporting Organization, has
consistently maintained that intellectual property owners must have
access to domain name registrants’ personal contact information in order
to police infringement of their intellectual property. See, e.g., Matters
Related to WHOIS, DNSO Intellectual Property Constituency, at
http://ipc.songbird.com/ whois_paper.html.
51
For a list of the current ICANN-Registrar agreements, see
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html. All such registrars
(approximately 160 as of this writing) are contractually obligated to
collect and publish personal data of their registrants. See, e.g.,
November 1999 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (which applies to
registrars accredited in the top-level domains .COM, .NET, and .ORG), at
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-10nov99.htm. See also
May 2001 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (which applies to
registrars in .BIZ, .INFO, and .NAME top-level domains), at
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm.
52
There are, of course, other ways to communicate on the Internet other
than by maintaining a web site, such as by electronic mail and
messengering systems.
53
See ICANN’s current Registrar Accreditation Agreement (May 17,
2001), at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm,,
which provides:
Public Access to Data on Registered Names. During the Term of
this Agreement:
3.3.1 At its expense, Registrar shall provide an interactive web
page and a port 43 Whois service providing free public query-
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name GEORGEWBUSH-IS-A-MURDERER.COM in order to maintain a
website critical of the President’s foreign policy is first required to
disclose her full name, address, and other contact information to
her domain name registrar. Although one of the important
functions of ICANN has been to bring about choice and
competition among domain name registrars, on policies like this
one no divergence or competition is possible. Each domain name
registrar is obligated, in accordance with its contractual
arrangements with ICANN, to adhere to this mandatory ICANN
policy.54 And, just as domain name registrars are contractually
obligated to adhere to this disclosure policy by virtue of their
contracts with ICANN,55 domain name holders are required to
assent to this disclosure policy by virtue of their contracts with
based access to up-to-date (i.e., updated at least daily) data
concerning all active Registered Names sponsored by Registrar
for each TLD [Top Level Domain] in which it is accredited. The
data accessible shall consist of elements that are designated from
time to time according to an ICANN adopted specification or
policy. Until ICANN otherwise specifies by means of an
ICANN adopted specification or policy, this data shall consist
of the following elements as contained in Registrar's database:
3.3.1.1 The name of the Registered Name;
3.3.1.2 The names of the primary nameserver and secondary
nameserver(s) for the Registered Name;
3.3.1.3 The identity of Registrar (which may be provided
through Registrar's website);
3.3.1.4 The original creation date of the registration;
3.3.1.5 The expiration date of the registration;
3.3.1.6 The name and postal address of the Registered Name
Holder;
3.3.1.7 The name, postal address, e-mail address, voice
telephone number, and (where available) fax number of the
technical contact for the Registered Name; and
3.3.1.8 The name, postal address, e-mail address, voice
telephone number, and (where available) fax number of the
administrative contact for the Registered Name.
(Emphasis added).
54
See id.
55
Id.
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their domain name registrar.
Accordingly, a domain name
holder’s failure to initially provide, or to maintain on an ongoing
basis, accurate personal contact information is grounds for
cancellation of her domain name.57 Attempts to speak or publish
anonymously via a website are thus subject to the penalty that
one’s website will be taken down.
Furthermore, mandatory ICANN policy obliges domain
name registrars to maintain such contact information about all
domain name holders in a publicly available and searchable form.
Thus, anyone interested in learning the identity of the person
responsible for registering and maintaining the website
58
BUSHLIED.COM
or FUCKSADDAM.COM59 would simply need to
conduct a search at one of the many locations available on the
Internet for searching the “WHOIS” database – i.e., the database of
domain name holders’ contact information.60
In short, ICANN, by virtue of its control over the Domain
Name System, enjoys the power to establish prerequisites for
obtaining a domain name, which translates into the power to
establish prerequisites for maintaining a website. Because the
56

See, e.g., VeriSign Service Agreement Version Number 6.4., Par. 4, at
http://www.netsol.com/en_US/legal/static-service-agreement.jhtml
(requiring domain name registrants to: “(1) provide certain true, current,
complete and accurate information about you as required by the
application process; and (2) maintain and update according to our
modification procedures the information you provided to us when
purchasing our services as needed to keep it current, complete and
accurate.”).
57
See, e.g., id. Failure to provide accurate contact information is also a
factor militating against a domain name holder’s ability to maintain
ownership of the domain name in a dispute between a trademark owner
and a domain name holder under ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy, see text accompanying notes 66-67, as well as under the recentlyenacted Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, see 17 U.S.C. §
1125(d).
58
See http://www.bushlied.com.
59
See http://www.fucksaddam.com.
60
See Verisign’s website for searching WHOIS records, at
http:/www.netsol.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois.
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ability to express oneself via a website constitutes one of the most
powerful vehicles for expression available today, ICANN’s control
over the Domain Name System translates into control over this
form of expression on the Internet. ICANN’s policy prohibiting
domain names (and hence websites) from being maintained
anonymously has a substantial impact on individuals’ ability to
express themselves anonymously (or pseudonymously) via the
Internet.
D. ICANN’s Decision-Making Implicating Critical Speech on the
Internet
ICANN’s control over the Domain Name System also
encompasses the power to establish policies for resolving disputes
between intellectual property owners and domain name holders in
ways that affect speech on the Internet. As one of its most
significant exercises of policy-making authority, ICANN enacted a
policy for resolving disputes between trademark owners and
domain name holders that impacts the free speech rights of Internet
users. When the United States ceded control over the Domain
Name System to ICANN, it charged ICANN with developing a
policy for resolving disputes between trademark owners and
domain name holders over the entitlement to use a domain name.61
When ceding this control over the Domain Name System and
related policy-making to ICANN, the United States and other
framers of ICANN were primarily concerned with the problem of
bad faith “cybersquatting”62 -- the phenomenon of registering as
domain names variants of famous trademarks (such as
63
MCDONALDS.COM and CANDYLAND.COM ) by an entity other than
61

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 31,747.
See id. at 31,746.
63
In one of the earliest cases of cybersquatting, the domain name
MCDONALDS.COM was registered by journalist Joshua Quittner in 1994,
in an attempt to bring attention to the growing importance of the
Internet. McDonalds attempted to win the domain name in court, but
was unsuccessful and thus had to reach an out-of-court settlement with
Quittner. See Michael Leventhal, Who Can Stake A Claim in
Nov.
6,
1995,
at
Cyberspace?
WIREDLAW,
http://technoculture.mira.net.au/hypermail/0001.html. See also Joshua
62
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the trademark owner in order to sell back such a domain name to
the trademark owner for profit. At the time, courts in the United
States and other countries were becoming overwhelmed with
handling such cases of cybersquatting, while trademark owners
were clamoring for more powerful causes of action and
jurisdictional tools to pursue bad faith cybersquatters. Reacting to
these concerns, the United States and other framers of ICANN
believed that ICANN could implement a policy regarding
cybersquatting that would enable the efficient resolution of such
disputes via online, extrajudicial mechanisms, in a manner that
would not impact Internet users’ substantive rights. Accordingly,
soon after its formation, ICANN exercised the policy-making
authority specifically conferred upon it64 and adopted its Uniform
Quittner, Billions Registered -- Right Now, There Are No Rules To Keep
You From Owning a Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet
Address, WIRED, October 1994, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.10/mcdonalds.html.
See also Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 9, 1996), available at
http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/candy.txt (Hasbro, owner of the mark “Candy Land” for the
popular children’s board game, successfully sought preliminary
injunction against website’s use of CANDYLAND.COM in connection with
pornographic website).
64
The manner in which ICANN exercised this policy-making authority is
detailed with great care by Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B.
Dinwoodie. See Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).
In short, in the White Paper, the Department of Commerce specified that
recommendations regarding a trademark/domain name dispute resolution
policy be initially developed by the World Intellectual Property
Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with
promoting the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.
The Department of Commerce recommended that WIPO conduct an
international consultation on the subject. Although WIPO apparently
attempted to fulfill its advisory charge in this policy development
process in such a way as to maximize opportunities for broad based
global input and comment, see id. at 166-67, the consultative process
suffered from a number of flaws, notably (and unsurprisingly) the
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Dispute Resolution Policy (the UDRP).
This Policy allocates
rights between trademark owners and domain name holders in a
manner favorable to trademark owners relative to pre-existing
trademark law. It empowers the owner of a trademark (or of some
other recognized right in a name66) to have a domain name
domination by commercial and intellectual property interests. See id. at
169; A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERK.
TECH. L. J. 617 (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on
WIPO’s Management of Internet Names and Addresses (May 1999),
available
at
http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm.
Although the White Paper specified that WIPO’s policy development
role was to be purely advisory, in actuality its recommendations were
treated as presumptively valid by the relevant ICANN decision-makers.
See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 177-78 & n.124. Shortly after WIPO
submitted its domain name dispute policy recommendations to ICANN,
in April 1999 ICANN’s (interim) board of directors referred the report to
its Domain Name Supporting Organization – the lower level ICANN
organization charged with developing policy on domain name matters.
The DNSO’s Names Council formed a working group to study the WIPO
recommendations. Although this working group was supposed to
represent the views of various Internet stakeholders, in fact it failed to
include a representative of the Noncommercial Domain Name Holders
Constituency, which was to represent noncommercial organizations
concerned with freedom of expression. See id. at 181 & n.143. After
adopting the working group’s report (with minor modifications), the
Names Council submitted this report to the ICANN Board. Shortly
thereafter, the ICANN Board convened a small drafting committee to
finalize the domain name dispute resolution policy. On October 24,
1999, the ICANN Board approved the final Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, as well as the Rules for the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy. See id. at 178-79.
65
See ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [hereinafter UDRP].
66
Although the text of the UDRP limits its scope to trademarks and
service marks, UDRP panels have ordered the transfer of domain names
involving common law marks, company names, trade names, and
personal names. See, e.g., Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd WIPO
Case No. D2000-0210 (May
29, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html
(personal name); Realmark Cape Harbour L.L.C. v. Lawrence S. Lewis,
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removed from a domain name holder by establishing: (1) that the
domain name is identical or “confusingly similar” to the trademark
at issue; (2) that the domain name holder has no “rights or
legitimate interests” regarding the domain name; and (3) that the
domain name was registered and is being used in “bad faith.”67 In
determining whether to remove the domain name from a holder,
the administrative panelist charged with such decision-making68 is
required to take into account the nature of the expressive content
provided on the domain name holder’s website, as well as the
expressive nature of the disputed domain name itself (such as
BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM).
The Policy therefore
requires the decision-maker to weigh competing intellectual
property and free speech claims of trademark owners and domain
name holders. Decisions reached under the Policy essentially have
the effect of law because all domain name registrars are required to
comply with them pursuant to their contracts with ICANN,69 and
all domain name holders are required to comply with them by
virtue of their contracts with their domain name registrars.70
Because, as I discuss below, this dispute resolution policy
implicates domain name holders’ free speech rights – with respect
to the expression embodied within domain names themselves and
WIPO Case No. D2000-1435 (December 11, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1435.html
(common law trademark). See generally Annette Kur, UDRP, MaxPlanck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and
Competition Law,
at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/OnlinePublikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf.
67
See UDRP, supra note 65, at 4(a).
68
Decisions under the UDRP are made by Administrative Panels from
one of four ICANN-approved Dispute Resolution Providers. See UDRP,
supra note 65, at Par. 1. A list of such Providers is available at
www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
69
See text accompanying note 55.
70
See, e.g., VeriSign Service Agreement Version Number 6.4., Par. 5, at
http://www.netsol.com/en_US/legal/static-service-agreement.jhtml (“If
you registered a domain name through us, you agree to be bound by our
current domain name dispute policy that is incorporated herein and made
a part of this Agreement by reference [i.e., the UDRP]”).
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with respect to the expressive content available on the websites at
issue – the Policy represents another important example of ICANN
decision-making affecting speech on the Internet.
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy was designed to
facilitate the rapid, online resolution of global disputes between
trademark owners and domain name holders over the entitlement
to use a particular domain name.71 Because the Policy provides
for the online, extra-judicial resolution of disputes in a timeframe
of unprecedented speed and low cost,72 it is very attractive to
trademark owners compared to litigation (whether under
traditional trademark infringement,73 trademark dilution,74 the
recently-enacted Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,75
or other causes of action available under national law).
Proceedings under the Policy are decided by private arbitrators
from one of four dispute resolution providers selected by
ICANN.76 Since the Policy became effective in 1999, it has been
71

The Policy provides for evidence on the entitlement to use the domain
name to be presented electronically and for decisions to be reached
within 60 days of an action being filed. See UDRP, supra note 65, Pars.
2, 15.
72
The UDRP Rules require parties to submit evidence in electronic form
and to communicate with the Dispute Resolution Provider in the same
manner. See UDRP, supra note 65, at Par. 2.
73
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
74
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
75
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
76
The four approved dispute resolution providers that are currently
operating are the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre; the
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution; the National Arbitration Forum;
and the World Intellectual Property Organization. See ICANN,
Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
Under the Policy, the Complainant is required to pay the costs of
arbitration and is entitled, in the first instance, to select which arbitration
provider’s panelist will handle the dispute, see UDRP, supra note 65, at
Par. 4(d). The Respondent domain name holder, however, may opt to
augment the arbitration panel from one to three members (in which case
the Respondent is entitled to designate three candidates drawn from any
ICANN-approved Provider’s list of panelists to serve as an additional
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invoked by trademark owners in more than 6,000 cases involving
over 10,000 domain names.77
An examination of several decisions reached under the
Policy elucidates the ways in which this Policy implicates Internet
users’ free speech rights. Although I do not attempt to conduct a
comprehensive analysis of the thousands of cases decided under
the UDRP, I focus instead on a disturbing trend – a line of cases
that, according to Milton Mueller’s comprehensive analysis of the
6,000+ UDRP decisions rendered, poses “a significant threat to
free and robust expression on the Internet.”78 As Mueller
explains, these decisions make clear that “numerous complainants
have used domain name challenges as part of an attempt to silence
critics.”79 Below I examine several representative UDRP cases
that implicate Internet users’ right to free expression in subtle but
nonetheless significant ways.
In one such case, Burlington Coat Factory brought an
action against the holder of various domain names incorporating
the “Burlington” trademark challenging the latter’s registration of
the
domain
names
BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM,
BURLINGTONKILLFACTORY.COM,
BURLINGTONBLOODBURLINGTONDEATHFACTORY.COM,
80
FACTORY.COM, and BURLINGTONHOLOCAUST.-COM.
As is typical
of the circumstances of many such actions, in the Burlington case
the domain name holder (one Martin Bender), an outspoken
panelist), in which case the Respondent must share the costs of the
arbitration. For a persuasive argument that the current system facilitates
forum-shopping on the part of Complainants that undermines the
fairness of ICANN’s UDRP, see Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An
Examination of the Allegations of Systematic Unfairness in the ICANN
UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903 (2002).
77
See Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain
Name/Trademark
Disputes
under
ICANN’s
UDRP,
at
http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf.
78
Id. at 27.
79
Id. at 23.
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Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation v. Smartsoft, L.L.C.
c/o Jan Knepper, WIPO Case No. D2001-1792 (March 1, 2001), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1792.html.
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animal rights activist, was using the domain names themselves, as
well as the speech made available at the websites under such
domain names, to criticize the trademark owner. The challenged
websites criticized Burlington Coat Factory’s animal treatment
practices and contained, for example, pictures of animals allegedly
mistreated by Burlington in its manufacturing process (including
pictures of allegedly skinned dogs).81 Burlington alleged that the
above domain names were “confusingly similar” to its Burlington
mark and claimed that Internet users would be confused as to
whether Burlington had endorsed or sponsored such marks.
Despite the fact that the domain names themselves
embodied bona fide criticism of Burlington, the UDRP panelist
deciding the case concluded that the domain names were
confusingly similar to the Burlington trademark, that Bender had
no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names at issue, and
that the domain names were acquired and used in “bad faith.”
Accordingly, the panelist ordered the challenged domain names
removed from Bender and transferred to Burlington. First, the
panelist held that in order to find that the domain names at issue
were not confusingly similar to the trademarks at issue, the use of
the domain names “must be genuine protest or criticism, and must
not be commercial.”82 The panelist went on to inquire into the
nature and content available at the challenged websites and to hold
that because the websites at issue contained commercial
advertisements, they could not be considered genuine protest or
criticism sites, despite the fact that the commercial (banner)
advertisements they contained were not in any way related to the
Burlington mark nor to Burlington’s products. On the second
element – the domain name holder’s legitimate rights or interests
in the domain names at issue – once again the panelist adverted to
the commercial nature of the advertisements available on the
challenged website and found that because the websites available
under these domain names included a modicum of commercial
content -- viz., commercial advertisements for unrelated Internet
services – Bender could not be found to be making “fair use for a
81
82

See http://www.skinnedpuppy.com.
WIPO Case No. D2001-1792.
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non-commercial purpose” under the Policy and therefore could not
be said to have “rights or legitimate interests” in the disputed
domain names.83 Finally, on the issue of bad faith, the panelist
again found that the presence of commercial content on the
website at issue was dispositive against the domain name holder.84
In short, in the Burlington case, an inquiry into the nature
of the content available at the challenged websites – and
particularly the presence of advertisements on the Burlington
protest website that were wholly unrelated to the Burlington mark
or products -- led the panelist to conclude that the challenged
domain names were not protected under the Policy and must be
transferred to Burlington, despite the fact that both the domain
names themselves and the content of the web sites available under
such domain names were devoted to legitimate expression critical
of the trademark owner.
In many other cases, the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy has been interpreted in a manner implicating Internet users’
free speech rights and, in particular, their right to engage in critical
speech. For example, in the case involving the domain name
85
LAKAIXA.COM, a well-known Spanish bank and owner of the
registered trademark “La Caixa” brought an action seeking to
prevent the use of this domain name.86 The domain name holder in
that case registered this domain name -- in which the “C” in “La
Caixa” mark was switched to a “K” -- in order to use the domain
name itself, and the content available on the website, to convey
“political and cultural criticism of La Caixa’s banking activity,
international banks, and capitalism in general.”87 Toward that end,
the domain name holder provided content on his site that was
“critical of capitalism, the international banking system, and La

83

Id.
Id.
85
See Caixa d’Estalvis y Pensions de Barcelona ("La Caixa") v.
Namezero.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-0360 (May 3, 2001), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0360.html.
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Caixa.”
Once again, despite the bona fide critical expression
provided at the challenged website and embodied within the
challenged domain name itself, the trademark owner claimed that
LAKAIXA.COM was confusingly similar to its mark, that the domain
name holder had no rights or legitimate interests in the name, and
that the name was registered and used in bad faith.
The LAKAIXA.COM panelist acknowledged that the domain
name holder was using the content available at the site -- and the
domain name itself -- to criticize the trademark owner’s banking
practices and to protest its policies, but nonetheless found in favor
of the trademark owner on grounds similar to those found in the
Burlington proceeding. While acknowledging that “it has become
common to substitute the letter ‘K’ for the letter ‘C’ in order to
express a left-wing or anarchist protest,”89 and that the
LAKAIXA.COM website itself “made quite a liberal use of the letter
‘K’ in the above counterculture sense,”90 the panelist nevertheless
ordered that the domain name be removed from the critic and
transferred to the trademark owner.
Finding that the
“counterculture meaning of political criticism embodied in
converting ‘Cs’ to ‘Ks’ would likely be understood only by a
minority of Internet users,” and adverting to the fact that one of the
links on the website at issue was to an (unrelated) commercial
service, the panelist found that the domain name was confusingly
similar to the trademark, that the domain name holder had no
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and that the
domain name was registered and used in bad faith.91
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy has also been
invoked in disputes involving domain names of the
“[company]sucks” variety, such as the dispute involving the
88

Id.
The panelist acknowledged that “in the slang of a certain juvenile
counterculture, spellings such as ‘kommunist,’ ‘komrade,’ and so on are
quite common, originating in an old expression of political science,
‘factor K’ (from ‘Kremlin’), in order to indicate the geopolitical
significance of Soviet Russia.” Id.
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domain name VIVENDIUNIVERSALSUCKS.COM, used by the domain
name holder to criticize the practices of Vivendi Universal, a
global entertainment conglomerate and parent of Universal City
Studios.92 In that dispute, the panelist found that, because nonEnglish speakers might be unfamiliar with the negative
connotations of the term “sucks,” it was reasonable to conclude
that VIVENDIUNIVERSALSUCKS.COM was confusingly similar to the
trademark owner’s mark “Vivendi Universal.”93 The panelist also
found that the domain name holder’s “supposedly free speech use
of the disputed domain name” was illegitimate and insufficient to
establish his “rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name,
and that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith, and
accordingly ordered the domain name removed from the domain
name holder.94 Among the 6,000 plus decisions that have been
handed down applying the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy to
over 10,000 domain names, many similar cases95 implicate Internet
92

Vivendi Universal v. Mr. Jay David Sallen and GO247.COM, INC.,
WIPO Case No. D2001-1121 (November 7, 2001), at
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Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000), at
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Case
No.
D2000–0636
(August
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2000),
at
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users’ right to maintain a website critical of a trademark owner.
Indeed, Dr. Mueller’s comprehensive analysis of the 6,000+
domain name proceedings reported thus far demonstrates that in
cases where domain name holders used their domain names to
criticize or comment upon complainants’ mark or business,
complainants successfully invoked the Policy to silence such
criticism or commentary in 67% of the cases.96 This analysis
demonstrates that the UDRP has had a significant impact on
Internet users’ ability to engage in critical speech.
It might be objected that the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy does not substantially affect Internet users’ right to free
speech because and to the extent that users can ultimately
vindicate their free speech rights within their own national courts.
Although the Policy was intended to provide a global forum for the
resolution of international trademark/domain name disputes in the
first instance, in theory the Policy does not wholly supplant
national trademark or free speech protections.97
It is unclear,
however, whether a domain name holder whose domain name is
removed from her under a UDRP action will be able effectively to
invoke her own country’s substantive trademark or free speech
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protections to overturn the result reached under the UDRP.
98

It is debatable, for example, whether a disappointed U.S. domain name
holder will be able effectively to assert a First Amendment defense in
federal court against (1) a trademark holder who brought a successful
UDRP action against her, (2) a UDRP panel, or (3) ICANN itself. First,
although UDRP procedures are not binding on U.S. courts per se, it may
be difficult for a defeated domain name holder to convince a U.S. court
to consider an “appeal” of an unfavorable UDRP decision. Unless a
disappointed domain name registrant brings a challenge in court within
10 days of the UDRP decision, the UDRP decision is deemed final and
binding upon the domain name registrar (and registrant). See UDRP,
supra note 65, at 4(k). This short window itself, coupled with the
difficulty and expense of hiring an attorney within this 10-day window to
represent oneself in court, is a powerful disincentive to seeking review
by a U.S. court. See, e.g., Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 64, at 203-4
(explaining that the “extremely short ten-day window within which
respondents must file such a proceeding is likely to exert a significant
deterrent effect on national court review.”)
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a defeated domain name
holder would be able to sue ICANN or a UDRP arbitration panel directly
in a federal court for infringing the domain name holder’s free speech
rights based on the former’s adoption of the UDRP or the latter’s
implementation thereof. Because ICANN and the UDRP panel may not
be considered state actors under the First Amendment’s state action
doctrine, see Froomkin, supra note 1, at 113, a defeated domain name
holder may be unable to sue ICANN or a UDRP panel for violating her
First Amendment rights.
Finally, a U.S. (or other national) court considering an “appeal”
of a UDRP decision in which a defeated domain name holder sues the
trademark owner may conclude that it does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over such a dispute because no state action was involved or
because the dispute presents no case or controversy under U.S. law. See
Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 205 (“It is unclear whether respondents
who do muster the resources to appeal panel decisions in fact possess a
cause of action against a trademark owner under national laws seeking
retention of the domain name.”)
The arbitration and litigation over the domain name
“CORINTHIANS.COM” is illustrative in this regard. In that case,
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, an entity that held the Brazilian
trademark rights to the mark “Corinthians” for a Brazilian soccer team,
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It might be further objected that the UDRP has built-in
checks to prevent its abusive use by trademark owners. Indeed,
the UDRP was intended to apply only to clear cases of bad faith
cybersquatting and was not intended to apply to cases where
domain name holders enjoyed legitimate rights and interests in
their domain names. Toward that end, the UDRP discourages bad
faith complaints by trademark owners by empowering panelists to
label bad faith or abusive complaints as “reverse domain name
hijacking.”99 However, beyond being labeled a “reverse domain
brought a UDRP proceeding against the domain name registrant of
“CORINTHIANS.COM,” who had used this website, at least in part, to offer
biblical quotes from the Book of Corinthians. The UDRP panel
considering the dispute ordered the transfer of “CORINTHIANS.COM” to
the Brazilian trademark owner. See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA
v. David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000). The
domain name holder challenged this decision in U.S. district court,
seeking a declaratory judgment that his use of the domain name did not
violate the Brazilian entity’s trademark rights. The Brazilian trademark
owner, in its motion to dismiss, contended that it had no intention of
bringing a lawsuit against the domain name holder under U.S. (or any
other countries’) trademark law, and that therefore the U.S. district court
did not enjoy subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See Sallen v.
Corinthians Licenciamentos Ltda., CV-00-11555-WGY and CV-0012011-WGY (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000).
The district court agreed,
finding that there was no case or controversy for it to adjudicate, and
dismissed plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action. Id. While the First
Circuit reversed and held that U.S. trademark law provided it with
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, see Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos Ltda., 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), this issue is still one
of first impression within other U.S. circuit courts and has not been
resolved definitively within other nations’ courts.
In short, it is fair to conclude that “national courts are unlikely to
exercise significant de facto external checks on abuses of authority by
UDRP panelists . . . .” Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 210.
99
See UDRP, supra note 65, Rule 15(e) (“If after considering the
submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was brought in bad faith,
for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or was
brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall
declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and
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name hijacker,” there are no sanctions for such bad faith behavior
on the part of trademark owners and the UDRP currently provides
no meaningful disincentives to trademark owners’ engaging in
such overreaching.
It might be further objected that, at the end of the day,
ICANN merely enjoys the power to remove a domain name from a
domain name holder or to prevent an entity from registering a
domain name in the first place, and that, given this limited power,
ICANN’s speech-regarding policies do not justify an in-depth
inquiry into ICANN’s policies and governance structure. While
this argument has some merit, I contend that, first, a governing
entity such as ICANN that functions as a public actor regulating a
forum of expression need not enjoy a monopoly on the use of force
(or otherwise satisfy the traditional requirements of a “state”) to
justify such an inquiry.100 Second, even though ICANN’s
authority is currently limited, some have called for ICANN’s
power to be expanded in the future,101 while others have held out
ICANN as a model for international policy-making and dispute
resolution involving a broader class of Internet-related issues.102 If
we conceptualize ICANN as ICANN Version 1.x or as a dry run
for an international policy-making body of broader powers over
the Internet, it becomes important at this early stage to undertake
an inquiry into how to incorporate liberal democratic norms within
such a decision-making body in order to render such decisionmaking morally legitimate.
constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.”)
100
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 107
(1989) (explaining that an organization need not constitute a state in the
usual sense of a coercive order in order for us meaningfully to inquire
into the democratic legitimacy of its decision-making processes).
101
WIPO, for example, has suggested that the scope of the UDRP be
expanded.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, The
Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain
Name
System,
at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/html/executivesummary.html.
102
See Froomkin, supra note 1, at n.36 (quoting United States and other
officials’ calls for ICANN to serve as a “model for global rule-making in
the Twenty-First Century.”).
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In short, ICANN today serves a subtle but significant role
in regulating Internet speech. ICANN enjoys the power to
establish prerequisites for registering domain names, which
translates into the power to establish prerequisites for maintaining
websites, and thus for engaging in an important form of
expression. In exercising this authority to date, ICANN has
established a policy prohibiting the anonymous registration of
domain names, and hence prohibiting Internet users from engaging
in anonymous or pseudonymous speech via their websites.
Furthermore, ICANN has exercised its authority over the Domain
Name System to implement a policy for resolving disputes
between trademark owners and domain name holders. This policy
involves consideration of the nature and content of speech
embodied within domain names and contained within websites,
and implicates Internet users’ ability to engage in critical
expression. Because ICANN enjoys the power to enact binding
policies affecting speech within this important forum for
expression, ICANN serves a significant public ordering
function103 – the power to allocate rights in ways that implicate
freedom of speech. Given its performance of this function,
ICANN’s governance structure should embody the normative
ideals – both procedural and substantive – of liberal democracy.
In particular, as I explain below, given ICANN’s power to
implement regulations affecting speech, it does not suffice for
ICANN merely to embody the procedural democratic norm of
political equality by embodying representative decision-making
structures; rather, ICANN must also embody substantive
democratic norms, and accord special protections for the
fundamental individual rights that are integral to liberal
democracy, including the right of freedom of expression.
III.

NORMATIVE IDEALS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

When the United States ceded control over the Domain
Name System and other elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to
103

See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 2, at 215-16.
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ICANN, it sought assurances from ICANN that it would embody
certain norms of democratic decision-making within its
governance structure. As I explain in Part IV, ICANN’s framers
sought to ensure that ICANN’s decision-making would reflect and
account for the views of those affected by its decision-making, by
incorporating representative decision-making structures and by
conducting direct elections of representatives by Internet users
worldwide. ICANN’s framers, however, were unconcerned with
the issue of whether and how ICANN’s form of government would
secure individuals’ fundamental rights, including the right to free
speech. As a result, while ICANN’s framers were clearly
concerned with the extent to which ICANN would embody
procedural democratic norms, they were insufficiently concerned
with how well ICANN would embody the substantive norms
integral to liberal democracy. In this Part, I consider the
procedural and substantive normative ideals that are integral to
liberal democracy and that should therefore be embodied within
ICANN’s governance structure.
The concept of liberal democracy, like the concept of
democracy itself, means many things to many people.104 Yet
shared among these divergent conceptions of liberal democracy is
a core of normative ideals, including both procedural and
substantive normative ideals. In this Part, I elucidate the essential
contours of these core normative ideals, focusing in particular on
certain shared normative ideals of liberal democracy that are
integral to large-scale governments and implicated by ICANN’s
governance of the Internet’s infrastructure. I then discuss in Parts
IV and V how these procedural and substantive normative ideals
can be implemented within the context of ICANN’s governance
structure.
While the primary purpose of all democratic systems of
government is to effectuate the will of the people, the goal of
104

See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395,
407 (2000) (quoting Don Herzog’s comment that “liberalism is a
tradition, not a single view, and like any other tradition it is best
conceived of as a family of disagreements.”)
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liberal democratic systems is to effectuate the will of the people
within a framework of protections for individual rights and
freedoms.105 Liberal democracy thus requires that persons affected
by collective democratic decision-making be accorded certain
fundamental rights, and that these fundamental rights be protected
from infringement by the democratic process itself.106 Thus, while
liberal democracies have in place procedural mechanisms to
advance the democratic norms of political participation and
political equality and to ensure that each citizen’s vote is counted
fairly and equally, they also provide frameworks for protecting
fundamental individual rights from infringement by democratic
decision-making processes.107
While liberal democratic theorists are united in their
commitment to protecting fundamental individual rights and
freedoms, they differ in their understanding of how such rights are
best protected. “Procedural” democratic theorists generally claim
that individual rights will be adequately protected by procedural
mechanisms alone – i.e., by essentially democratic processes
designed with an eye toward protecting against abridgements of
fundamental rights.108
Procedural democratic theorists thus
contend that carefully-designed representative systems of
government over large-scale democratic units will adequately
protect individuals’ fundamental rights, and will best advance
(what they consider to be) the pre-eminent individual right – the
right to self-governance. “Substantive” democratic theorists, on
105

See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 154 (1989);
WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An
Inquiry into International Law, 87 GEO. L. J. 707 (1999) (defining liberal
democracy as “a political system with governments elicited by popular
majority, and with the rule of law enshrined to protect those not in the
majority.”)
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See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 104, at 408 (explaining that “while
democracy aims to actualize the popular will, liberalism gives primacy to
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See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 105, at 163-92; JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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the other hand, remain skeptical about the capacity of thoroughgoing democratic processes to protect fundamental individual
rights, and contend that other mechanisms beyond essentially
democratic processes are necessary to protect such rights – for
example, constitutionally-enshrined fundamental rights and
systems of (non-democratic) judicial review of democratic
decision-making to protect such rights.109 While both schools of
liberal democratic theory begin with the premise that governments
should reflect the will of the people while protecting individuals’
fundamental rights, they embody different conceptions as to how
to best protect such rights within an essentially democratic form of
government.
A. Procedural Norms of Liberal Democracy: Political Equality
and Representation
A fundamental component of liberal democracy is the norm
of political equality, which requires, at a minimum, that each
citizen’s views are counted equally on matters within the scope of
the government’s decision-making.110 The norm of political
equality presupposes, at the very least, a system of fair voting
within a context of broad suffrage.111 Within this essential
framework of political equality, the past several centuries have
brought about a dramatic transformation in the way in which the
norm of political equality is implemented within democratic
systems. In particular, as the size of democratic units expanded,
the character of democratic government transformed from direct or
plebiscitary democracy to indirect, representative democracy.112
Within small-scale democratic systems (such as ancient Greek
city-states), the fundamental normative ideal of political equality
was implemented in the form of direct democracy, in which all
citizens could physically assemble in one place to deliberate and
109

See text accompanying notes 138-62.
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vote upon matters put to collective decision-making.
As the
size and scope of democratic units expanded, the normative ideal
of political equality of necessity became implemented in a
different manner, via indirect, representative systems. Systems of
representative democratic decision-making thus brought with them
the ability to implement indirect systems of democracy over units
of ever-increasing size and scale. In translating the logic of
political equality from small-scale to large-scale democratic units,
the direct democracy of citizen assemblies was thus replaced by
indirect, representative forms of government. As this transition
was effected, the upper limits on the size of a democratic unit –
which had previously been set by the practical limits of such an
assembly -- were eliminated, with the consequence that no citizen
body was too large to enjoy a democratic form of government.114
The representative form of government thus became integral to
translating the quintessential democratic norm of political equality
within large-scale democratic units.
While essentially necessitated by the change in the size
and scale of a democratic unit, the move from direct to
representative democracy is also accompanied by an increased
capacity of such systems to protect individuals’ fundamental
rights, according to procedural democratic theorists.115 Such
theorists contend that representative democratic systems are
inherently more conducive, as compared to direct democratic
systems, to advancing the values of liberal democracy, in that they
are more conducive than direct democracies to protecting
individuals’ fundamental rights. First, representative democracies
are more conducive than direct democracies to deliberative
decision-making, which in itself is an important safeguard for
individual rights.116 Second, systems of representation for largescale democratic units are less prone to factional decision-
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making.
According to procedural democratic theorists, these
features of representative decision-making within large-scale
democratic units serve as important safeguards for fundamental
individual rights that are essential to liberal democracy.
1. Representation and Deliberation
For procedural democratic theorists, two important moves
for protecting fundamental individual rights within a democracy
are the move from direct democracy to a representative democracy
and the move from representative democracy over a limited sphere
to representative democracy over an extended sphere.118 Within
direct democracies (of necessarily smaller scale), it is more likely
that a majority will be motivated by a desire to invade the
fundamental rights of some members of the minority, while a
representative democracy serves as a potential antidote to such
tendencies.119 Although the interposition of representatives into
the majoritarian democratic process cannot fully eliminate the
possibility that collective decisions will invade individuals’
fundamental rights, it can substantially neutralize such
potential.120 First, the interposition of representatives facilitates
the introduction of deliberation, perspective, and publicmindedness into the decision-making process. By filtering
individuals’ immediate passions and interests through the lens of
representatives, a representative government tends to “refine”
those passions and interests, channel them toward the public good,
and concomitantly reduce the likelihood that collective decisions
117
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will be made in derogation of fundamental individual rights.
Introducing representatives who enjoy the opportunity and
inclination to deliberate toward achieving the overall public good
and are less inclined to act out of partial or impassioned motives
brings us closer the goal of implementing a liberal democratic
government that secures individuals’ fundamental rights and
freedoms. Representative democracy thus constitutes a significant
step beyond direct democracy in its power to discern the
considered, deliberative voice of the people and to hold in check
the potential of collective decision-making to invade individuals’
fundamental rights. The facilitation of deliberation in the
collective decision-making process enables the decision-makers to
“arrive at the cool and deliberate sense of the community,”122 as a
means of protecting citizens “against their own temporary errors
and delusions.”123
Because the deliberative nature of the representative
democratic process carries so much theoretical weight for the
procedural democratic theorist in protecting individuals’ rights
and freedoms, it becomes crucial to articulate a meaningful and
robust definition of deliberation. Modern procedural democratic
theorists have devoted substantial efforts to articulating an ideal of
deliberation within a system of representative democracy that aims
to fulfill this important theoretical role.124 James Fishkin, among
the pre-eminent modern theorists of deliberative democracy,
articulates an ideal of deliberation that is characterized by “free
and equal discussion, unlimited in its duration, constrained only
by the consensus which would be arrived at by the force of the
better argument,”125 in which every argument thought to be
relevant by anyone would be given as extensive a hearing as
anyone wanted.126 In a similar vein, theorist David Braybrooke
articulates the deliberative ideal of the “logically complete
121
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debate,” which enjoys similarities to philosopher Jurgen
Habermas’s “ideal speech situation.”127 Within the logically
complete debate,
[T]he participants, turn by turn, raise proposals and invoke
arguments for them; and the other participants deal with all
the proposals and answer all the arguments not their own .
. . Thus when the issue is resolved, say by a majority
voting to adopt a certain set of proposals, every participant,
whether in the majority or in the minority, will have the
same complete information about the track that the debate
has taken.128
Such deliberation among decision-makers, and presumably also
among citizens affected by such decision-making, serves to ensure
that all reasonable arguments in favor of and against a particular
act of collective decision-making are heard, and that the decisionmakers have before them complete information about the effects
of their proposed decision-making. Facilitating such robust
deliberation within a government’s decision-making helps to
ensure that such decision-making will not invade individuals’
fundamental rights.
In short, procedural democratic theorists claim that
representative democratic systems are more conducive than direct
democracies to protecting individuals’ fundamental rights because
and to the extent that they facilitate an abstraction from
individuals’ “temporary errors and delusions,” elicit the “cool and
deliberate sense of the community,” and facilitate deliberative,
impartial, and logically complete decision-making.
2. Extending the Sphere of the Democratic Unit
Beyond the values of perspective, impartiality, and
deliberation that representative democratic systems presumably
bring to bear on collective decision-making, the size, scope, and
127
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complexity of interests at play within large-scale democratic
systems also play an important role in protecting individuals’
fundamental rights, according to procedural liberal democratic
theorists.129 Within a small-scale democratic unit, so the theory
goes, citizens are more likely to be homogenous, to readily form
effective factions adverse to the fundamental rights of members of
the minority, and to reach and implement collective decisions
(whether directly or through their representatives) that threaten
such rights. As the sphere is expanded, a greater diversity and
multiplicity of interests is comprehended, serving to neutralize the
potential for factional decision-making adverse to fundamental
rights.
The salutary consequences of extending the sphere of the
democratic unit for the protection of individual rights are
powerfully drawn out by James Madison in The Federalist Papers.
Building upon the political theory of philosopher David Hume,130
Madison contends in Federalist 10 that within a representative
democracy, as you “extend the sphere and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests, you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens.”131 Expanding upon this argument in
Federalist 51, Madison explains that:
It is of great importance in a [representative democracy] . .
. to guard one part of society against the injustice of the
other part . . . . [The method of providing against this evil
within a representative democracy is by] comprehending in
the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will
render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable. [In this way,] the
129
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society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests,
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of
the minority will be in little danger of interested
combinations of the majority. In a free government the
security for civil rights . . . consists . . . in the multiplicity of
interests. The degree of security . . . will depend upon the
number of interests . . . . and this may be presumed to
depend on the extent of the country and the number of
people comprehended under the same government. . . .
[T]he larger the society, provided it be within a practical
sphere, the more duly capable it will be of selfgovernment.132
According to this theory, within any given small-scale (and likely
homogenous) democratic unit, it is not unlikely that a particular
interest adverse to the rights of some members of the minority
(think Socrates in ancient Greece133) will dominate. But, as the
scope of the democratic unit as a whole – and of each
representative’s districts – is expanded to encompass a multiplicity
of interests, it becomes less likely that any one such potentially
factional interest will be able to capture any one representative,
and more importantly, less likely that any one interest will be able
to dominate the ultimate decision-making body. Extending the
sphere of a representative democracy thus renders it more likely
that representatives will be elected free of factional concerns and
of interests that would otherwise potentially threaten individuals’
132
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fundamental rights and freedoms.
Modern advocates of procedural democratic theory contend
that extending the sphere of a republic correlates with
incorporating a multiplicity of interests among citizens that holds
in check the potential for factional decision-making for two
reasons: first, because of the likelihood that citizens’ interests
would be multidimensional, and second, because citizens would
need to become part of shifting coalitions to advance and protect
these interests.135 According to this theory, these shifting
coalitions of interest groups will then serve to hold in check the
potential for democratic systems to engage in decision-making
adverse to fundamental individual rights. The multiplicity of
interests that is presumed to be coextensive with an extended
sphere serves as a check on the formation and efficacy of majority
factions that would act in disregard of individuals’ fundamental
rights. A large-scale democratic unit would likely incorporate
such a heterogeneity of interests that no single faction could
(permanently) oppress the rest of the republic because this
multiplicity of interests would lead to constantly shifting
coalitions.136 Within an extended republic, members of an
electorate with complex and diverse interests would be less likely
134
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to form permanent effective factional coalitions because of the
likelihood that members of one coalition will over time need the
support of members of other coalitions on subsequent (or
concurrent) issues of importance to them. As Robert Dahl
describes this “hypothesis of overlapping memberships”:
If most individuals in the society identify themselves with
more than one group, then there is some positive
probability that any majority contains individuals who
identify themselves for certain purposes with the threatened
minority. Members of the threatened minority who
strongly prefer their alternative will make their feelings
known to these members of the tentative majority who also,
at some psychological level, identify themselves with the
minority. Some of these sympathizers will shift their
support away from the majority alternative and the majority
will crumble.137
In short, procedural democratic theorists contend that the
extension of the sphere of a (representative) democracy itself is an
important means of protecting individuals’ fundamental rights
because extending the sphere enables the comprehension of a
dynamic multiplicity of interests within the democratic unit, which
serves to hold in check the power of any one factional interest
adverse to the fundamental rights of individuals to dominate.
Together with the values that the representative form of
government itself brings to bear on collective decision-making,
systems of representation over the large scale embody meaningful
safeguards for individuals’ fundamental rights, according to
procedural democratic theorists.
B. Substantive Norms of Liberal Democracy and the Protection of
Freedom of Expression
While procedural democratic theorists contend that the
embodiment of procedural normative ideals -- such as deliberative,
representative decision-making over the large scale – provides
137
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meaningful protections for individuals’ fundamental rights,
substantive democratic theorists contend that democratic processes
alone cannot secure individuals’ fundamental rights against the
potential for adverse decision-making. These theorists contend
that individuals cannot and should not simply commit themselves
to whatever the outcome of the democratic process happens to be,
however procedurally shored up to attempt to protect individuals’
fundamental rights. Substantive democratic theorists thus “give
priority to the justice or rightness of the substantive outcomes of
decisions rather than to the process by which the decisions are
reached,”138 and believe that “because the liberty [such
fundamental rights] make possible is potentially threatened by the
democratic process, to preserve fundamental rights and liberties
we must protect them from infringement even by means of the
democratic process itself.”139 As democratic theorist James Fishkin
puts it, “even when votes are counted equally or viewpoints are
equally voiced . . . , there remains the possibility that majorities
can do bad things, that they can commit sufficiently flagrant
injustices upon some of their number that any normative claim of
democracy would be undermined.”140 Thus, unless one takes the
position that democracy is an end in itself irrespective of the
substance of the decisions it produces, in designing a democratic
system, it will be important to embody substantive protections for
certain fundamental individual rights within the democracy’s
governance structure.141
Substantive democratic theorists contend that, no matter
how extensively and deeply a representative decision-making body
deliberates, the possibility still exists that it would choose to act in
such a way as to infringe fundamental individual rights. Such
theorists claim that it is therefore necessary to embody certain
substantive normative ideals within a democratic government,
substantive means by which to evaluate the decisions of the
138
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democratic government (and to invalidate such decisions), to
ensure that such decisions do not invade individuals’ fundamental
rights. As democratic theorist Robert Dahl characterizes this issue,
“special procedures . . . do not solve the problem with which we
began: how to protect fundamental rights and interests from
violation by the democratic process if those rights or interests are
invaded by means of the democratic process.”142 Substantive
democratic theorists thus contend that democratic systems, to be
legitimate, must incorporate substantive checks on the power of
the people to effectuate their will. Encompassed within such
substantive checks is the articulation of fundamental rights within
a constitution or some other embodiment of higher-order
democratic decision-making that cannot be abridged by ordinary
democratic decision-making processes, matters affecting which are
effectively removed from the purview of such collective decisionmaking.
The articulation and imposition of substantive checks on
democracies present several formidable problems.
First,
proponents of substantive checks need to justify some means by
which to discern those rights that are so fundamental as to be
protected from democratic decision-making. If such rights are to
be protected from the purview of ordinary democratic decisionmaking, then some process other than democratic decision-making
itself is needed to articulate such rights. Relatedly, such theorists
need to confront and respond to the “countermajoritarian
difficulty,”143 to provide a coherent theoretical justification for
overruling the will of (the majority of) the people in order to
protect fundamental individual rights (of the minority), to provide
a justification for pre-empting the moral authority of the people to
self-governance in the name of (what substantive democratic
theorists claim to be) fundamental individual rights.
Substantive democratic theorists have long struggled with
the theoretical issues associated with the protection of fundamental
individual rights, such as freedom of speech, articulated in
documents such as the United States Bill of Rights and the
142
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European Convention on Human Rights.
How one approaches
the protection of fundamental rights within democracies in turn
depends on one’s overarching notion of democracy itself. If one
begins from the premise that the most important right to advance
within liberal democracies is the right to self-governance itself,
then one will be reticent to champion special protections for any
particular substantive rights, or will be willing to grant special
protections only for those substantive rights and freedoms that are
themselves integral to self-governance.145 If, on the other hand,
one’s version of liberal democracy entails a theory of prior rights –
of rights such as freedom of conscience or freedom of expression
that are prior to the right to self-governance and possess a moral
standing independent of the right to self-governance – then the
right to self-governance may justifiably be limited where necessary
to protect such prior, independent rights. In what follows, I
explore the justifications for protecting fundamental individual
rights within liberal democracies, with a focus on protection for
freedom of expression.
1. Process-Based Justifications for Protecting Freedom of
Expression
As we saw above, procedural democratic theorists
generally claim that carefully-designed democratic processes will
provide meaningful safeguards for fundamental individual rights,
and are reticent to prescribe or evaluate substantive outcomes of
such democratic processes. Yet even theorists who would rely
primarily on democratic processes to protect fundamental
individual rights acknowledge that certain substantive rights are so
integral to the democratic process itself that they must be accorded
special protection. Because of the essential role that such
substantive rights serve within the democratic process, and
because of the potential that an unrestrained democracy might
infringe such rights, even procedurally-oriented democratic
theorists advocate (or at least tolerate) special protections for such
rights. Robert Dahl’s explication of the importance of protecting
144
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certain substantive rights within
representative of this approach:

democratic

systems

is

The right to self-government through the democratic
process is itself one of the most fundamental rights a
person can possess. . . . But if people are entitled to govern
themselves, then they are also entitled to all of the rights
that are necessary in order for them to govern themselves,
that is, all the rights that are essential to the democratic
process. On this reasoning, a set of basic political rights
can be derived from one of the most fundamental of all the
rights to which human beings are entitled: the right to selfgovernment through the democratic process. . . . This
general moral right translates into an array of moral and
legal rights [that are] integral to the democratic process.
They aren’t ontologically separate from – or prior to or
superior to – the democratic process. To the extent that the
democratic process exists in a political system, all of these
rights must also exist. . . . The right to the democratic
process is [therefore] a claim to all the general and
specific rights – moral, legal, and constitutional – that are
necessary to it, including freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and association. . . . The democratic process is
not only essential to one of the most important of all
political goods – the right of people to govern themselves –
but is itself a rich bundle of substantive rights.146
According to such theorists, certain fundamental rights – including
the right to free speech, press, assembly, and association -- are so
integral to the democratic process that they must be accorded
special protections within the democratic process – and if
necessary, against the democratic process -- on the grounds that
they are necessary to the effective functioning of the democratic
process itself.
John Hart Ely147 and Alexander Meiklejohn148 advance
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similar instrumentalist theories for according special protections
for the right to free speech within a democratic society, and if
necessary, against the democratic process itself. Ely, for example,
claims that according special protections for certain substantive
rights – protections against ordinary majoritarian democratic
decision-making processes -- is necessary and justified to the
extent that such protections are integral to the effective functioning
of the democratic process itself. He claims that because freedom
of expression, in particular, is necessary to “make our
governmental processes work, to ensure the open and informed
discussion of political issues, and to check government when it
gets out of bounds,” according special protections for freedom of
expression is justified on instrumentalist grounds.149 Similarly,
Meiklejohn claims that because citizens of a democratic state are
required to govern themselves, they must be accorded the right to
express themselves and to have full access to relevant information
in order to perform their duties as self-governing citizens.150 Such
process-based accounts share the feature of justifying protection
for freedom of expression not on the grounds that this right is
intrinsically valuable, but rather on the instrumentalist grounds that
protecting freedom of expression is integral to the functioning of a
democratic system.
Accordingly, although process-oriented
democratic theorists generally rely upon procedural democratic
148
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norms, such as representation and deliberation, to safeguard
individuals’ fundamental rights, because of the important role
freedom of expression serves within the process of selfgovernance, such theorists acknowledge the necessity of according
special protections for freedom of expression – even against the
democratic process, if necessary.
2. Foundationalist Justifications for Protecting Freedom of
Expression
A separate strain of liberal democratic theory justifies
protecting substantive rights, such as freedom of expression,
within democratic governments on the ground that such rights
possess a moral standing independent of and prior to the
democratic process. Such foundationalist accounts of protecting
free expression do not appeal to the function that free speech
serves in advancing the democratic process itself. Rather,
foundationalist accounts justify protecting freedom of expression
on the grounds that such protection is essential in order to regard
citizens as equal, autonomous, rational agents, each of whom is
sovereign in deciding for himself or herself what to believe and on
what basis to believe it.151 Under such accounts, which find their
roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant,152 for citizens to
recognize a democratic government as legitimate, they must be
able to regard themselves – and require that their government
regard them – as equal, autonomous, rational agents with the right
to receive and share information to enable them to make up their
minds on all manner of issues. Therefore, in order for the
authority of a democratic government to be considered morally
legitimate, such authority cannot encompass the power to restrict
the liberty of citizens by controlling their sources of information or
the expression of information that is integral to citizens’
autonomous decision-making.153
Philosopher John Rawls advances a similar account of the
151
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importance of protecting freedom of expression within democratic
systems of government. In brief, Rawls sets forth in Political
Liberalism a framework for the protection of political and personal
liberties within a democratic society. He begins by developing a
conception of justice from the perspective of persons as free and
equal, and argues that individuals’ freedom consists in their
possession of two moral powers: a capacity for a sense of justice
and for a conception of the good.154 Rawls then derives a scheme
of equal basic liberties that are “essential social conditions for the
adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral
personality over a complete life.”155 Included among these equal
basic liberties are freedom of thought, freedom of association,
liberty of conscience, and political liberties – including
representative democratic institutions, freedom of speech and the
press, and freedom of assembly.156
According to these
foundationalist accounts, freedom of speech is granted special
primacy and must be granted special protection within democratic
institutions because such freedom is essential for citizens to realize
their potential as rational, autonomous, equal individuals with a
capacity for a conception of the good and for a sense of justice.
Having argued in favor of granting special protection for
the right to freedom of expression within democratic systems –
whether on instrumentalist or foundationalist grounds -- it then
becomes necessary to consider the means by which such protection
can be meaningfully implemented.
One familiar form of
protection is to articulate such fundamental rights in a constitution
or bill of rights157 and then to commit the protection of such rights
to extra-democratic guardians not subject to democratic decisionmaking processes themselves – such as within a system of
independent judicial review. Although democratic theorists
espouse widely divergent views of the legitimacy of such
democracy-checking institutions,158 even procedurally-inclined
154
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democratic theorists acknowledge the important role served by
such democracy-checking institutions in protecting certain
fundamental rights.159 Thus, procedural democratic theorists such
as Robert Dahl160 and John Hart Ely161 acknowledge that where a
system of judicial review is limited to invalidating laws that
infringe upon those individual rights and freedoms that are integral
to the democratic process itself – including the right to freedom of
expression -- such a system would be instrumental to and
consistent with (what they take to be) the pre-eminent liberal
democratic value – viz., the right to self-governance through the
democratic process. Substantive democratic theorists, of course,
look more favorably upon the role of democracy-checking
institutions like judicial review and claim that such institutions are
integral to granting meaningful protections for individuals’
(intrinsically valuable) fundamental rights.162
In short, liberal democracies accord protections not only
for the procedural value of political equality advanced through
carefully-designed representative governments, but also for certain
substantive values, such as freedom of expression. In general,
such substantive values are justified by procedural democratic
theorists on the grounds that they are integral to the democratic
process itself and by substantive democratic theorists on the
grounds that they are intrinsically valuable and necessary for
citizens to be regarded as equal, autonomous, and rational agents.
Whether justified on instrumentalist grounds or foundationalist
grounds, the right to freedom of expression is an essential
component of liberal democratic systems, as are requisite
institutions – such as the institution of independent judicial review
– that are empowered to protect such rights.
IV.
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COMMITMENTS TO THE NORMATIVE IDEALS OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
A. Introduction
When the United States ceded control over key elements of
the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN, it recognized that ICANN,
in exercising its substantial policy-making authority with respect
to issues of intellectual property and domain names, would have
the power to affect Internet users’ rights and interests worldwide.
In view of the substantial policy-making control over Internet
conduct that it was vesting in this new entity, the United States
sought assurances from ICANN that it would embody important
procedural norms of democracy within its governance structure. In
particular, as I discuss in this Part, the United States required – and
ICANN promised – that ICANN would embody norms of
deliberative and representative decision-making (over an extended
sphere) that would enable it to take into account the preferences of
Internet users worldwide while attempting to constrain the
potential for factional decision-making. In five years since
ICANN has assumed this power, ICANN’s powers have expanded
beyond those initially contemplated and ICANN revisited its
commitment to embodying such procedural democratic norms
within its governance structure. First, ICANN’s decision-making
authority has extended to encompass the authority to regulate
speech on the Internet.163 Second, after a period of self-evaluation,
ICANN is now retreating from its initial commitments to
embodying procedural norms of liberal democracy within its
governance structure. In this Part, I examine ICANN’s initial
commitments to embodying procedural norms of liberal
democracy within its governance structure, as well as ICANN’s
recent retreat from these commitments. In the next Part, I contend
that because ICANN has the authority to enact policies affecting
speech, ICANN’s governance structure should be revised to
incorporate meaningful protections for the substantive democratic
norm of freedom of expression.
In the early days of the formation of (what was to become)
163
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ICANN, several of the ICANN “framers” believed that, in
exercising its responsibility over key elements of the Internet’s
infrastructure, ICANN could and should limit itself to technical
issues, and therefore need not – and indeed should not -- be
designed as a democratic institution of governance that accounted
for the preferences of those affected by its decision-making.164
Other framers insisted that ICANN would inevitably be drawn into
policy-making, including policy-making affecting Internet users’
substantive rights, and that ICANN – in order to exercise its
authority legitimately -- must incorporate norms of democratic
decision-making within its governance structure. The United
States government – which because of its historical role in
managing the Domain Name System was deeply involved in the
formation and structuring of ICANN165 -- (correctly) predicted that
governance of the Internet infrastructure would likely involve both
issues of a technical nature166 and matters of substantive policyformation. Recognizing the dual nature of the responsibility for
governing the Internet’s infrastructure that it was about to commit
to this sui generis entity, the U.S. government sought to bring into
being an institution that included a role both for technical expertise
and a role for essentially democratic decision-making – complete
with mechanisms designed to secure ICANN’s embodiment of
globally representative and deliberative decision-making
structures. In designing the technical standard-setting component
of this entity, the U.S. government drew on pre-existing groups of
experts that had largely been responsible for coordinating technical
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Internet infrastructure issues.
In contemplating the requirements
for the substantive policy-making component of this entity, the
framers of ICANN had a more difficult task. They could not rely
upon the carefully-designed, pre-existing structures of
representative government embodied within the United States
government, because of course they were attempting to create a
globally representative entity to establish policies governing
Internet conduct the effects of which transcended the boundaries of
territorial sovereigns. And, the framers chose not to work within
the framework of any pre-existing international entities committed
to policy-making on such matters (like a branch of the United
Nations such as the International Telecommunications Union or
the World Intellectual Property Organization),168 because of the
concern that such international governance entities would be
unable to respond quickly and efficiently to the fast-paced nature
of Internet-related developments.169 Instead, ICANN’s framers
chose to embark upon an unprecedented project of designing
specifications for a new type of global democratic decision-making
entity that was to be essentially unaffiliated with any pre-existing
governmental entity, and yet representative of and accountable to
those affected by its decision-making.
The United States, acting through the Department of
Commerce,170 first set out its understanding of and requirements
for the governance structure of (what was to become) ICANN in
its Domain Name System White Paper of 1998.171 Shortly
thereafter, ICANN was formed as a non-profit corporation with the
hopes of satisfying the specifications set forth in the White Paper
and being chosen for the role of governing the Domain Name
System. ICANN then promulgated its Articles of Incorporation
and Bylaws in accordance with the requirements set forth in the
167
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White Paper. ICANN was then chosen by the United States to
take over governance of the Domain Name System and other
aspects of the Internet’s infrastructure,172 and accordingly, the
Department of Commerce and ICANN entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding which set forth further
requirements that ICANN’s governance structure was to meet in
order to assume this governance role.173
Over the past five years, as ICANN has exercised its power
to regulate aspects of Internet conduct in ways that affect the rights
of Internet users worldwide, ICANN has been the subject of
substantial scrutiny.174 As the scope of its power becomes more
widely understood, ICANN must be called upon to embody more
effectively the procedural norms of liberal democracy that it
initially committed to, as well as to embody the substantive
democratic norm of protecting freedom of expression. In Part V, I
consider the ways in which ICANN should encompass protections
for freedom of expression. In this Part, I analyze the extent to
which the procedural ideals of liberal democracy are embodied
within (1) the original understanding of and specifications for the
design of ICANN’s governance structure, as set forth by its
framers in the White Paper and the Memorandum of
Understanding between Department of Commerce and ICANN; (2)
ICANN’s initial governance structure, as embodied in its initial
Bylaws and other constitutive documents; and (3) ICANN’s
reformed governance structure, as set forth in the Committee on
ICANN Evolution and Reform’s October 2002 Final
Implementation Report and Recommendations.175
B. The Original Understanding of and Specifications for ICANN’s
Governance Structure
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In 1997, in response to calls from industry for Internet selfregulation and to calls from international entities for reducing U.S.
control over the Internet, then-President Clinton charged the
Department of Commerce with the responsibility of divesting the
U.S. government of control over key elements of the Internet’s
infrastructure and with privatizing the Domain Name System.176
After consulting extensively with various parties that would be
affected by such privatization and receiving comments on a draft
statement of policy,177 in 1998 the Department of Commerce set
forth a Statement of Policy, known as the Domain Name System
White Paper. In the White Paper, the Department of Commerce
set forth requirements for the entity that would govern these key
elements of the Internet’s infrastructure and the requisite
characteristics of this entity’s governance structure. The White
Paper sets forth four key principles based on which the U.S.
Government was prepared to transfer governance of the Domain
Name System to a private entity: (1) maintaining stability of the
Internet in the transition process; (2) enabling competition within
the Domain Name System; (3) effectuating private, bottom-up
coordination of the Domain Name System in lieu of any form of
(traditional) top-down governmental control (whether national or
international); and (4) representation of the interests of Internet
users worldwide in developing policies regarding the Internet’s
infrastructure.178
In setting forth the United States’ understanding of and
specifications for this new institution, the White Paper placed
particularly strong emphasis on the role that representation would
176
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play in securing democratic legitimacy for this new entity.
Although the White Paper does not refer to norms of democratic
government explicitly, it does commit this entity to embodying
representative decision-making structures to take into account the
diversity of interests of Internet users worldwide.179 Specifically,
the White Paper asserted that this new governance entity must
embody structures designed to “reflect the functional and
geographic diversity of the Internet and its users,”180 and
articulated several specific types of Internet-related interests and
functions that should be represented.181 The White Paper stated
further that “since these constituencies are international, we would
expect the [new entity’s decision-making body] to be broadly
representative of the global Internet community.”182 On the
subject of representation within this entity’s ultimate decisionmaking body -- the Board of Directors -- the White Paper
committed the entity to “establishing a system for electing a Board
of Directors that reflected the geographical and functional
diversity of the Internet, [which] preserves as much as possible the
tradition of bottom-up governance of the Internet, and [through
which] Board members are elected [to] ensure broad representation
and participation in the election process.”183 Consistent with its
focus on the importance of broad suffrage and representation of
Internet users’ interests, the White Paper was also concerned to
limit the possibility of factional decision-making by self-interested
parties, which it hoped to reduce through open, transparent, and
representative decision-making. The White Paper states, for
example, that the entity’s organizing documents should ensure that
it will be “governed on the basis of a sound and transparent
179
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decision-making process, which protects against capture by a selfinterested faction,” and that its “processes should be fair, open, and
pro-competitive, protecting against capture by a narrow group of
stakeholders.”184
Regarding the embodiment of substantive democratic
norms, such as freedom of expression, within this new entity’s
foundational documents, at the time the White Paper was drafted,
the United States and other ICANN framers failed to appreciate or
anticipate the ways in which governance of the Internet’s
infrastructure would implicate such substantive rights.
Accordingly, the White Paper failed to provide for the embodiment
of such substantive democratic norms within ICANN’s
foundational documents.
Several commentators on the
Department of Commerce’s earlier, draft statement of policy
contended that ICANN’s decision-making would affect speech and
that therefore its foundational documents should embody explicit
protections for freedom of expression. In response, the White
Paper observed (ironically, in light of the countermajoritarian185
function of protections for freedom of expression) that such free
speech concerns were raised only by a minority of commentators
and concluded summarily that “free speech protections will not be
disturbed [by ICANN’s Internet governance] and, therefore, need
not be specifically included with its core principles.”186
Similarly, on the issue of whether domain name registrars
should maintain a publicly-available database correlating domain
names with the names and addresses of individuals who registered
such domain names, the White Paper dismissed the free speech and
informational privacy concerns of a (small) number of
commenters. Observing that “commentators largely agreed that
domain name registries should maintain up-to-date, readily
searchable domain name databases that contain the information
necessary to locate a domain name holder so as to better track
cases of intellectual property infringement,”187 while only “a few
184

Id.
See text accompanying notes 249-89.
186
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 31,743-44.
187
Id.
185

Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance
65
commentators noted that privacy and free speech issues should be
considered in this context,”188 the White Paper once again
dismissed this “minority” position, and encouraged ICANN to
require individuals to disclose their identity as a prerequisite for
registering a domain name (and hence for maintaining a web
site).189
Finally, the White Paper, while committing ICANN to
developing a mandatory dispute resolution policy for resolving
disputes between trademark owners and domain name holders,
predicted (naively) that such a policy could be limited to disposing
of cases of uncontroversial bad faith cybersquatting, that such a
policy would not extend to disputes involving “legitimate
competing rights” between trademark owners and domain name
holders, and therefore that such a policy would not implicate
domain name holders’ free speech rights.190 In short, the White
Paper (naively, at least in retrospect) predicted that ICANN could
exercise its control over the Internet’s infrastructure in such a way
as to not implicate Internet users’ free speech (or other important)
substantive rights, and therefore concluded that ICANN’s
governance structure need not embody any special protections for
such rights.
Rather, it insisted that ICANN’s normative
obligations would be exhausted by embodying the procedural
norms of liberal democracy, such as deliberation and
representation over an extended sphere.
After setting forth the processes and principles under
which this new entity should govern and outlining the policies that
this entity would be charged with implementing, the White Paper
concluded that “the U.S. Government is prepared to recognize, by
entering into agreements with and to seek international support for,
a new not-for-profit corporation formed by private sector Internet
stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address
system.”191 As to how such an entity would come into existence,
the White Paper invited “Internet stakeholders . . . to work together
188
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to form a new, private, not-for-profit corporation to manage
Domain Name System functions”192 in accordance with the
principles and policies set forth in the White Paper.
C. The Memorandum of Understanding and ICANN’s Initial
Governance Structure
Several months after the White Paper was released, a group
of Internet experts established a private, not-for-profit corporation
-- the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers -- as
a candidate for assuming the responsibility of governing the
Domain Name System and other key elements of the Internet’s
infrastructure.193 Within a short period of time, the Department of
Commerce concluded that ICANN was “the organization that best
demonstrated that it can accommodate the broad and diverse
interest groups that make up the Internet community.”194
Thereafter, the Department of Commerce entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN, under which the
two entities agreed to work together to “jointly design, develop,
and test the mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be
in place, and the steps necessary to transition management
responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or on behalf
of, the U.S. Government”195 to ICANN.
In this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the
Department of Commerce and ICANN reiterated and expanded
upon the commitments regarding ICANN’s governance structure
that were earlier articulated in the White Paper. The MoU, like the
White Paper, emphasized the importance of ICANN’s developing
processes of representative decision-making and committed the
parties to “collaborate on the design, development, and testing of
appropriate membership mechanisms that foster accountability to
and representation of the global and functional diversity of the
Internet and its users.”196 The MoU, however, went beyond the
192
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White Paper by including an important check on the scope of
ICANN’s power, by requiring independent review of ICANN
decision-making. Specifically, the MoU committed the parties to
“collaborate on the design, development, and testing of procedures
by which members of the Internet community adversely affected
by decisions that are in conflict with the bylaws of the organization
can seek external review of such decisions by a neutral third
party.”197
The Memorandum of Understanding also incorporated by
reference ICANN’s initial Bylaws198 and Articles of
Incorporation,199 in which ICANN further elaborated its
commitments to embodying certain procedural norms of
democratic decision-making. In particular, ICANN’s initial
Bylaws embodied its commitment to effectuating (1) a robust
system of representation, whereby half of the members of its Board
of Directors200 -- the At Large Directors -- would be directly
elected by Internet users, while other Board Members would
represent a pre-determined set of Internet-related functions and
interests201; (2) open forums for meaningful deliberation regarding
policy matters committed to ICANN; and (3) a mechanism for
adversely affected individuals to seek independent review by a
quasi-judicial body of ICANN decisions that were allegedly
reached in violation of ICANN’s Bylaws.
Within the
manifestation of ICANN’s governance structure reflected in
ICANN’s Bylaws, ICANN thus committed itself to embodying
several important procedural democratic norms, which I consider
in greater detail below.
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1. Commitments to Representation within ICANN’s Initial
Governance Structure
ICANN’s initial Bylaws incorporate a commitment to
embodying the democratic norm of political equality, achieved
both through direct election of representatives by Internet users
worldwide and through the selection of representatives tied to
Internet-related interests and functions. As set forth in these
Bylaws, ICANN’s ultimate decision-making body, the Board of
Directors, is comprised both of “At Large” representatives -- who
are to be directly elected by Internet users worldwide -- and
representatives selected to represent particular Internet-related
interests.202
First, ICANN’s initial Bylaws commit it to
developing a system for the direct election by Internet users
worldwide of a substantial subset (initially half203) of the Members
of its Board of Directors.204 In effectuating this commitment, after
an extensive process of evaluating methods and procedures for
global Internet elections,205 three years ago ICANN conducted an
election in which Internet users worldwide were able to vote and
which resulted in the election of five At Large Directors to
ICANN’s Board.206 Second, ICANN’s initial Bylaws provide for a
second subset of the Members of its Board to be directly elected by
three lower level councils or Supporting Organizations, each of
which is devoted to a different component of ICANN’s policymaking. In particular, three Board Members are selected by its
Domain Name Supporting Organization,207 three by its Address
Supporting Organization,208 and three by its Protocol Supporting
202
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Organization.
Each of these lower level Supporting Organizations was
charged with initially developing substantive or technical policy
within its subject area, and with forwarding its policy
recommendations to the Board of Directors, which enjoys ultimate
decision-making authority.210
The Protocol and Address
Supporting Organizations were charged with technical matters that
do not involve determinations of substantive policy, and as such,
their management structures are not designed to be broadly
representative. By contrast, the Domain Name Supporting
Organization was charged with responsibility for establishing
policy on a variety of domain name matters implicating speech. In
recognition of the important policy-making role it would come to
serve, the Domain Name Supporting Organization was itself
designed to be broadly representative along both functional and
interest group lines. The Domain Name Supporting Organization
Names Council, which was responsible for initially developing
policies concerning the Domain Name System, was elected by
members of seven pre-determined interest group constituencies211:
(1) commercial and business interests; (2) trademark and other
intellectual property and other counterfeiting interests; (3) noncommercial domain name holders; (4) Internet service providers
and connectivity providers; (5) registrars; (6) global top level
domain registries; and (7) country code top level domain registries.
The DNSO also included a General Assembly, which was a forum
for representation of domain name holders generally that was
“open to all who are willing to contribute effort to the work of the
DNSO.”212
Thus, the Domain Name Supporting Organization, which
was initially responsible for developing domain name policy, was
designed to be representative of Internet users along functional and
interest group lines. In turn, the Board of Directors, which is
209
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ultimately responsible for developing and implementing all
policies within ICANN’s decision-making purview, was to be
comprised both of representatives directly elected by Internet users
worldwide and by Directors selected to represent specific, predetermined Internet-related interests and functions.
2. Opportunities for Deliberation within ICANN’s Initial
Governance Structure
ICANN’s initial Bylaws also commit it to providing
substantial opportunities for deliberation and public participation
on decision-making matters within its purview, both within the
Board of Directors and within its lower level councils. These
Bylaws commit the Board of Directors to providing members of
the public affected by the Board’s decision-making with
reasonable notice of and opportunity to comment on its adoption of
proposed policies, to see and reply to comments of others, and to
providing a public forum at which proposed policies are openly
discussed.213
The Bylaws also provide opportunities for
deliberation on matters of policy development when they are
initially formulated within its Supporting Organizations. For
example, the Domain Name Supporting Organization’s Names
Council, which is responsible for initially developing domain
name policy, is charged with providing “appropriate means for
input and such participation as is practicable under the
circumstances by other interested parties.”214 In formulating its
decisions, the Names Council is also required to give the public an
opportunity to review and comment upon all relevant
documents,”215 and to ensure that all responsible views have been
heard and considered prior to a decision by the Names Council.”216
Additionally, the Domain Name Supporting Organization General
Assembly is designed to be an “open forum for participation in the
work of the DNSO, and open to all who are willing to contribute
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effort to the work of the DNSO.”
Furthermore, all Supporting
Organizations make extensive use of electronic listservs, which
provide a forum for interested and affected Internet users to voice
their concerns on and contribute extensively to policy matters
under consideration.
3. Commitments to Independent Review of ICANN DecisionMaking Within ICANN’s Initial Governance Structure
ICANN’s initial Bylaws also commit it to implementing a
system of independent, quasi-judicial review of its decisionmaking in the form of an Independent Review Panel, which would
be responsible for reviewing policies adopted by the ICANN
Board to determine whether the Board acted in conformance with
the Bylaws in adopting such policies.218 Specifically, ICANN’s
initial Bylaws require the Board of Directors to “adopt policies and
procedures for independent third party review of Board actions
alleged by an affected party to have violated [ICANN’s] Articles
of Incorporation or its Bylaws.”219
ICANN has undertaken steps to constitute an Independent
Review Panel, but to date, has not actually constituted such a
Panel. A Commission appointed by the Board to constitute an
Independent Review Panel concluded that insurmountable
obstacles existed that would prevent it from fulfilling its charge,220
and no forum as yet exists for affected Internet users to seek
independent review of decisions by ICANN that implicate such
users’ rights and interests.
In sum, ICANN’s initial governance structure was
characterized by a partially-fulfilled commitment to representative
and deliberative decision-making and an unfulfilled commitment
to
independent
review
of
ICANN
decision-making.
Representation of Internet users’ interests was to be achieved via
two mechanisms – first, through Internet users’ direct elections of
217
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members to the ICANN Board, and second, through representation
of certain pre-determined interests groups and ICANN functions.
Achieving meaningful representation via the mechanism of
direct election of representatives is surely fraught with many
difficulties, as the inquiries of ICANN’s At Large Study
Committee and the research into Internet elections in general have
established.221 Yet, at first blush, it would appear that meaningful
representation of Internet users’ interests could in theory be
secured via the mechanism of direct elections in which affected
Internet users across an extended sphere could have a voice.
As discussed above, ICANN’s initial governance structure
arguably incorporates some of the mechanisms designed to protect
individual rights and to check faction that are advanced by
procedural democratic theorists.222 ICANN was initially designed
as a representative democratic government (of sorts) that enjoyed
an extended sphere and that facilitated deliberation within its
decision-making processes.223 Despite these initial appearances,
however, the underlying predicates for the effective
implementation of these checks on faction do not obtain within the
ICANN realm.
Procedural democratic theorists of the Madisonian strain
contend that extending the sphere of a republic makes it less likely
that a majority with factional or tyrannous motives will in fact
exist and that even if such a majority did in fact exist, it would be
less likely to act as a unity.224 One might therefore conclude that
extending a republic’s sphere to incorporate the world over, while
employing technological advances to render representation
feasible, would advance the Madisonian desideratum of checking
factional decision-making (or decision-making violative of
individuals’ fundamental rights). Yet, these claims are based on
two assumptions that do not necessarily obtain within the ICANN
sphere: first, that potentially factional interests are correlated with
221
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geography, such that extending the sphere necessarily entails
multiplying interests, and second, that the government at issue has
the power to act so as to implicate a multiplicity of interests.
First, procedural democratic theorists of the Madisonian
strain assume that the way to encompass a multiplicity of interests
– in order ultimately to have these interests hold one another in
check – is to expand the geographic scope of the government.
This in turn is premised upon the assumption that interests are
correlated with geography. The relevant diversity of interests with
respect to regulation of Internet-related conduct, however – and
within the modern economy generally – does not neatly correlate
with diversity of geographic locale. Thus, an extended geographic
sphere by itself cannot ensure the requisite multiplicity of interests,
and some other method must be implemented in order to achieve
the desideratum of a multiplicity of interests. Second, although
there no doubt exists a multiplicity of interests among individuals
with respect to the regulation of Internet conduct, only a small
subset of such interests is implicated or put into play by ICANN
decision-making. Internet users throughout the world surely enjoy
a multiplicity of interests with respect to the regulation of Internetrelated conduct generally – interests in expanding the e-commerce
infrastructure, in providing greater Internet access and connectivity
to poorly served communities, protecting content from
unauthorized copying, securing protection for trademark and other
business interests, ensuring privacy of electronic communications,
protecting the free flow of information, etc. If a global,
representative government were to encompass and implicate such a
multiplicity of Internet-related interests, it might well suffice to
rely upon the mechanisms of representation and deliberation to
constrain the factional potential of such a government’s decisionmaking. ICANN, however, is a government of quite limited scope.
Broad enough to implicate free speech and intellectual property
rights, to be sure, but not broad enough as it is currently
configured to encompass a multiplicity of interests sufficient to
drive the system of checks on faction contemplated by procedural
democratic theorists to protect individuals’ fundamental rights.
ICANN’s decision-making power extends only to a narrow range
of issues. With respect to ICANN decision-making regarding the

Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance
74
resolution of trademark/domain name disputes, for example, the
array of interests is generally unidimensional on the intellectual
property–free speech axis.225
The application of the extension of the sphere component
of this proceduralist check on faction thus requires a
reconsideration of the mechanism by which to render this check
meaningful. First, extending the sphere, for procedural democratic
theorists, serves as a proxy for encompassing a citizen body with a
multiplicity of interests, and in particular, a dynamic multiplicity
of interests. Second, this check functions effectively with respect
to a government of broad jurisdiction that enjoys the power to
enact policies implicating not just one but several of a citizen’s
potential interests. But we have also seen that, because interests
do not necessarily correlate with geography in the Internet sphere,
the extension of the sphere in the Internet realm does not
necessarily bring with it the requisite complexity of interests,
especially given the narrow band of ICANN’s decision-making
power. The question becomes, are there other ways to achieve
within ICANN the proceduralist desideratum of a dynamic
complexity of interests so as to effectively implement this
procedural check on faction?
The framers of ICANN attempted to encompass and
represent a diverse set of interests on matters implicated by
ICANN decision-making in part by pre-determining these
implicated interest groups or constituencies.
For example,
ICANN’s Domain Name Supporting Organization Names
Council226 is elected by members of seven pre-determined interest
group constituencies: (1) commercial and business interests; (2)
trademark and other intellectual property and other counterfeiting
interests; (3) non-commercial domain name holders; (4) Internet
service providers and connectivity providers; (5) registrars; (6)
225
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global top level domain registries; and (7) country code top level
domain registries.227 Although these pre-determined interest
groups or constituencies were intended to ensure representation for
the variety and complexity of interests encompassed within each
such group, the pre-determined nature of such interests groups
means that members of such groups are less likely to be able to
dynamically array themselves into different interest groups and are
less likely to form shifting coalitions to protect against faction.
From the procedural democratic perspective, such pre-determined
interest groups may bind representatives elected by such groups
too closely to the partial interests of the pre-determined interest
groups that elected them into office and frustrate their ability to
transcend factional interests.
In sum, the extension of the sphere component of the
proceduralist check on faction serves as a proxy for incorporating
a dynamic complexity of interests among citizens, which in turn
serves to check faction in a representative government of
sufficiently broad powers. Because ICANN’s powers are limited,
however, the relevant interests of members of ICANN’s electorate
may be unidimensional, not complex. And, because ICANN’s
governance structure, in an attempt to incorporate a variety of
interests, partially pre-determined and crystallized this array of
interests, the relevant interests of members of ICANN’s electorate
may be static, not dynamic. Lacking the requisite complexity of
implicated interests among those affected by its decision-making,
and lacking a dynamic complexity of interests, ICANN’s (initial)
system of representation is insufficient to impose meaningful
checks on factional decision-making or decision-making adverse
to fundamental individual rights. In order to embody meaningful
protections for fundamental individual rights within ICANN’s
governance structure, either a dynamic multiplicity of interests
needs to be implicated by ICANN’s decision-making to render
proceduralist checks meaningful, or ICANN must embody
meaningful substantive constraints on its decision-making power
to constrain its ability to implicate fundamental individual rights.
227
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D. ICANN’s Proposed Reform of Its Governance Structure
Over the past five years, ICANN’s governance structure
has been the subject of substantial analysis and scrutiny, both
internal and external. First, as required by its initial Bylaws,
ICANN appointed an At Large Study Committee to evaluate how
best to conduct a system of global Internet elections of At Large
representatives to its Board of Directors. Second, and as also
required by its Bylaws, ICANN appointed an Independent Review
Commission to evaluate how to constitute an Independent Review
Panel responsible for reviewing ICANN policy decisions that
allegedly violated ICANN’s commitments made within its
foundational documents.228 Finally, and most significantly, in
February 2002 ICANN’s President released a report calling for
sweeping reforms of ICANN’s governance structure,229 in which
he called for, among other things, an end to direct elections by
Internet users of representatives to the Board of Directors230 and an
abandonment of ICANN’s commitment to constitute an
Independent Review Panel responsible for reviewing ICANN
policy decisions.231 The President’s calls for these sweeping
reforms in turn led to the appointment of an internal Committee on
ICANN Evolution and Reform.232 The Committee, building upon
228

See text accompanying notes 218-20.
M. Stuart Lynn, President's Report: ICANN – The Case for Reform
(Feb. 24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal24feb02.htm.
230
See id. at 13-15 (“I have come to the conclusion that the concept of At
Large membership elections from a self-selected pool of unknown voters
is not just flawed, but fatally flawed, and that continued devotion of
ICANN's very finite energy and resources down this path will very likely
prevent the creation of an effective and viable institution.”)
231
Id. (“The incipient Independent Review Panel has all the hallmarks of
adding to this waste.”)
232
See ICANN, Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/.
See also ICANN,
Preliminary Report Third Annual Meeting of the ICANN Board in
Marina del Rey (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/
minutes/prelim-report-15nov01.htm#01.132.
The Committee was
initially charged with the issuance of recommendations regarding the
229
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the recommendations of ICANN’s President, released its Final
Implementation Report and Recommendations in October 2002,
which was adopted by ICANN at its last meeting.233 During this
same period, ICANN’s governance structure and policy-making
has come under scrutiny from Congress and the Department of
Commerce as ICANN’s continued authority over the Internet’s
infrastructure was under consideration.234 An in-depth inquiry into
ICANN’s governance structure is therefore particularly timely as
ICANN’s governance structure is currently the focus of intense
scrutiny from many quarters.
following topics:
First and foremost, a list of essential functions of ICANN, and a
proposed mission statement for ICANN; ensuring that ICANN
decision-making takes proper account of the public interest in its
activities; meaningful participation and input from informed
Internet users participating through an At Large mechanism; the
structured participation of all stakeholders in the organization's
deliberations and decision-making, and in providing input for
policy that guides the decisions; the ways the different
components of any proposed structure will function together and
interact; the system of checks and balances that will ensure both
the effectiveness and the openness of the organization; the ways
in and conditions under which essential components of any
proposed structure that may not be able to be fully incorporated
at the start of the reform process will be included when
appropriate; and a description of a proposed transition process
from the current structure to any recommended new structure,
including a description of how the present components of
ICANN relate to the new proposed structure, and the anticipated
timetable for that transition.
See id.
233
See ICANN Preliminary Report, Meeting in Shanghai, 31 October
2002,
at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-31oct02.htm#EvolutionandReform.
234
ICANN Officers, Directors and other ICANN officials have been
called to testify before Congress several times, most recently, on June
12, 2002. See U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, Hearing Statements -- Hearing on ICANN Governance,
at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/hearings0202.htm.
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1. Reforms Proposed Within The October 2002 Final
Implementation Report and Recommendations
ICANN’s proposed reforms call for sweeping changes to
ICANN’s governance structure that substantially undermine its
commitment to embodying certain procedural norms of liberal
democracy and that fail in any way to embody the substantive
norms of liberal democracy. Because these reforms represent a
step in the wrong direction for ICANN, Congress and the
Department of Commerce should look with a critical eye upon
such proposed reforms, should insist that ICANN recommit itself
to embodying the procedural norms of liberal democracy, and
moreover, should require that ICANN’s governance structure
embody certain substantive norms of liberal democracy as a
precondition to ICANN’s continuing in its important public
ordering role.
A. Abandonment of Commitment to Direct Election of
Representatives to ICANN’s Board of Directors
The Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform’s Final
Implementation Report wholly abandons ICANN’s commitment to
global direct elections by Internet users of the majority of
representatives to the Board of Directors. In place of direct
elections, the Report proposes a “Nominating Committee”
responsible for selecting eight of the 15 members to the Board.235
Second, the Report substantially weakens ICANN’s earlier
commitment to establish an Independent Review Panel that would
be responsible for reviewing challenged ICANN decisions to
determine whether they are in conformance with its Bylaws.236
235

The Nominating Committee is discussed in greater detail below. The
Board would also be composed of two directors selected by each of the
three new Supporting Organizations and the President of ICANN as an
ex officio Director. See Proposed New Bylaws Recommended by the
Committee
on
ICANN
Evolution
and
Reform,
at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws02oct02.htm [hereinafter PROPOSED BYLAWS], Art. VI.
236
See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. IV, Section 3, Pars. 2
and 3.
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The use of a Nominating Committee to select the majority
of Board members – in lieu of having such Board members be
directly elected by Internet users – seriously erodes ICANN’s
commitment to being representative of and accountable to Internet
users worldwide.
Under the proposed new Bylaws, the
Nominating Committee would be composed of a group of
delegates with eighteen voting and four non-voting members from
various “constituencies.”237 Five of the voting delegates would be
selected by the newly-established At Large Advisory Committee,
while others would be appointed by constituencies such as a
“small business users’ constituency”; a “large business users’
constituency”; an “intellectual property constituency”; etc.238 The
proposed Bylaws essentially leave unclear how any given
constituency would be formed and recognized, as well as how such
constituencies would select their delegate to the Nominating
Committee (not to mention how the Nominating Committee would
go about selecting members of the Board).
The Report attempts to encompass and represent a diverse
set of interests on matters implicated by ICANN decision-making
by pre-determining these implicated constituencies. While, as
before, it might be argued that this pre-determination of interest
groups is necessary to allow ICANN to encompass the multiplicity
of interests necessary to impose meaningful checks on factional
decision-making, by pre-determining such interests, this proposed
structure makes it more difficult for affected interest groups to
form the shifting coalitions necessary to protect effectively against
faction.239 From a procedural democratic perspective, such pre237

The Blueprint states that “the Nom Com would initially be a 19member body composed of delegates (not representatives) appointed by
the following constituencies: gTLD registries; gTLD registrars; ccTLD
registries; Address registries; Internet service providers; Large business
users; Small business users; IP organizations; Academic and other public
entities; Consumer and civil society groups; Individual domain name
holders; IAB/IETF; TAC; GAC; Unaffiliated public interest persons.”
In addition, there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and two nonvoting liaisons. Id. at 13.
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See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. VII, Section 2.
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See text accompanying notes 135-37.
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determined interest groups may bind the members of the Board
elected by such groups too closely to the partial interests of the
pre-determined interest groups that elected them.
Second, the Report fails to include a vehicle for meaningful
independent review of the ICANN Board’s decision-making. In
form, the Report improves upon the President’s recommendations
by providing for an Independent Review Panel to check the
Board’s decision-making against the Bylaws, while the President’s
recommendations and the Interim Report abandoned the
commitment to independent review. The Proposed New Bylaws
provide that, in addition to a reconsideration process through
which the Board can be requested to reconsider its own decisions,
affected persons can seek review of ICANN Board Decisions by
an Independent Review Panel.240 There are several problems with
the contemplated review process. First, the Bylaws contemplate
that the Independent Review Panel will be operated by “an
international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by
ICANN . . . .”241 ICANN’s Board thus has the incentive to choose
in the first instance an international arbitration provider (such as
the World Intellectual Property Organization) that will be reticent
to overrule the Board. Second, ICANN will have an incentive to
remove or decline to reappoint any such international arbitration
provider that overrules a decision of the ICANN Board. Because
such providers are to be appointed by ICANN “from time to time,”
there appear to be no obstacles to ICANN’s removing a provider at
will. Third, the Bylaws provide that independent review by such
an international arbitration provider shall be on a loser pays
basis.242 While such fee-shifting systems arguably have merit in
proceedings in which monetary relief is reasonably anticipated,
such systems unreasonably skew litigants’ incentives when the
only relief available is injunctive, as here.243 Since the costs
240

See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. IV, Section 3, Pars. 2
and 3.
241
See id., Art. IV, Section 3, Par. 4.
242
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The Bylaws grant the IRP the authority to “declare whether an action
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associated with an international arbitration panel may be quite
high, this loser pays system will likely impose a substantial
disincentive to bringing challenges to ICANN’s decision-making.
In short, ICANN’s initial and fundamental commitment to
take into account the preferences of Internet users affected by its
decision-making is seriously eroded by the Final Report’s
recommendation to abandon direct elections by Internet users of
Board members and replace this system with the selection of those
Board members by an unelected Nominating Committee that
predetermines a set of interest groups in a manner that will likely
be ineffective in checking factional decision-making.
Furthermore, the method by which the proposed new Bylaws
would implement a system of independent review of ICANN’s
decision-making seriously undermines ICANN’s earlier
commitment to meaningful independent review of its decisionmaking. The Report therefore marks a substantial retreat from
ICANN’s initial commitments to embodying the procedural
normative ideals of liberal democracy and reflects a step in the
wrong direction for ICANN’s governance structure. Moreover,
the Report fails in any way to embody the substantive norms of
liberal democracy, the most relevant of which, for our purposes, is
freedom of expression. The Internet community and the
Department of Commerce should reject the proposals embodied in
the Report that weaken ICANN’s commitment to the procedural
ideals of liberal democracy and should insist that ICANN
recommit meaningfully to embodying such procedural norms.
Furthermore, ICANN should be required to embody the
substantive democratic norm of freedom of expression within its
foundational documents.
Even if ICANN were perfectly to embody the procedural
democratic norms of political equality, representation, and
deliberation, the embodiment of such procedural democratic norms
would not exhaust ICANN’s normative obligations. In order to
Incorporation or the Bylaws,” see PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235,
Art. V, Sec. 3, Par. 8b, but the IRP apparently does not have the
authority to grant any monetary relief to one challenging ICANN’s
policy-making.
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protect Internet users’ fundamental individual rights – most
importantly, the right of freedom of expression – ICANN’s
governance structure must be reformed to incorporate meaningful
protections for Internet users’ right to freedom of expression. As
we have seen,244 even a democratic system that perfectly embodied
the procedural norms of liberal democracy would still need to
secure special protections for fundamental rights such as freedom
of speech. Toward that end, in the next Part, I explain how
ICANN’s governance structure should be revised to incorporate
special protections for the fundamental right of freedom of
expression.
V. REVISING ICANN’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE TO INCORPORATE
THE SUBSTANTIVE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC NORM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
ICANN’s governance structure, while subject to substantial
revision, at best has reflected only the procedural norms of liberal
democracy – namely political equality, representation over an
extended sphere, and deliberation within its decision-making.
While ICANN should be called upon to recommit its governance
structure to embodying these procedural democratic norms,245 such
a recommitment is necessary but not sufficient to protecting
Internet users’ fundamental rights. Because ICANN enjoys the
power to enact policies affecting speech within the most important
public forum for expression ever created, ICANN must be held not
only to the procedural norms of liberal democracy, but also to the
substantive norms of liberal democracy. Specifically, ICANN
must be called upon to embody the substantive democratic norm of
freedom of expression within its governance structure and policymaking.
In according special protection for freedom of
expression, ICANN should learn from the ways in which the
United States -- a liberal democracy with a long-term commitment
to protecting freedom of expression – has implemented this
commitment.
244
245
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A. Implementing Special Protections for Freedom of
Expression within ICANN’s Foundational Documents
Secured by Independent Judicial Review
The United States experience teaches that merely
embodying the procedural democratic norm of political equality
may not suffice to secure freedom of expression, and that therefore
special protections for free speech are necessary. Such protections
should be embodied within a government’s foundational
documents and secured by independent review of legislation
affecting speech. ICANN’s original foundational documents, as
examined above, embody a commitment to the procedural
democratic norms of representation and deliberation. Its Bylaws
commit ICANN to representation of Internet users affected by its
decision-making along both functional and geographic lines and to
facilitating meaningful deliberation and public participation within
its decision-making. ICANN’s founders, however, failed to
incorporate within its foundational documents any commitments to
the substantive democratic norms integral to liberal democracy,
most importantly, the substantive democratic norm of freedom of
expression. Because ICANN has the power to enact regulations
affecting speech, ICANN’s foundational documents should be
amended to embody an explicit commitment to protecting the
substantive democratic norm of freedom of expression.
Specifically, the enumeration of ICANN’s general powers and
limitations on ICANN’s powers set forth within ICANN’s Bylaws
should commit ICANN to refrain from acting in such a way so as
to abridge Internet users’ freedom of expression. A provision
should be added to the section of ICANN’s Bylaws setting forth
limitations on its powers,246 with language to the following effect:
ICANN, in developing and applying its standards, policies,
procedures, or practices, should not act in such a way as to
abridge Internet users’ freedom of expression.
246

See BYLAWS, supra note 198, Art. IV(1)(B),(C) (setting forth
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In order to render meaningful this commitment to
protecting freedom of expression – along with its commitments to
procedural democratic norms embodied within its foundational
documents – ICANN should make good on its promise to
constitute meaningful independent review by an Independent
Review Panel.247 The Independent Review Panel should be
appointed and serve in a manner that is independent of ICANN’s
Board of Directors -- rather than being appointed by and serving
solely at the pleasure of the ICANN Board.
Upon incorporating special protection for freedom of
expression within its foundational documents and securing
enforcement of such protections via a meaningful independent
review process, ICANN’s appropriate policy-making bodies
should revise its speech-regarding policies to render them
protective of Internet users’ freedom of expression. In so doing,
ICANN should conform its policy-making to the general principle
of First Amendment jurisprudence that any regulation that restricts
speech must serve an articulated and important purpose and must
advance this purpose in such a way as to restrict the least speech
possible.248 Furthermore, ICANN should accord meaningful
protection for two types of countermajoritarian speech that would
otherwise be rendered particularly vulnerable within democracies - anonymous speech and critical speech. In particular, ICANN
should revise its policy prohibiting the anonymous registration and
maintenance of websites, which restricts individuals’ right to
engage in anonymous speech on the Internet, to render this policy
narrowly tailored to an important, articulated ICANN interest.
ICANN should also revise its policy for resolving disputes
between trademark owners and domain name holders, which
restricts individuals’ right to engage in critical expression on the
Internet, to render this policy narrowly tailored to an important,
articulated ICANN interest.
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B. Embodying the Right to Freedom of Expression within ICANN’s
Policy-Making: Lessons from First Amendment Protections for
Anonymous Speech
As discussed above, ICANN presently has in effect a
mandatory policy that prohibits Internet users from anonymously
registering and maintaining a website.249 As a prerequisite for
registering and maintaining a domain name -- and a website
available at that domain name -- an individual must reveal to her
domain name registrar her name and mailing address, as well as a
host of other contact information, and must also consent to the
publication of such personal information. ICANN requires all
domain name registrars to collect and publicize the names,
addresses, and other contact information of everyone who
maintains a website. This policy restricts Internet users’ free
speech rights by imposing substantial burdens on their ability to
speak and to publish anonymously on the Internet.
A
consideration of the United States’ anonymous speech
jurisprudence illuminates the importance of protecting speakers’
anonymity, which is an integral component of the right to free
speech.
Protecting the right to express oneself anonymously250 has
been an important component of American free speech
jurisprudence since the founding. Throughout the history of the
United States251 -- and indeed critical to its formation and
249

See text accompanying notes 46-60.
My use of the term “anonymous” includes not only speech with no
attribution of authorship, but also speech with a pseudonymous
attribution of authorship (such as THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, which the
true authors -- Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay –
chose to publish pseudonymously under the name of "Publius," a
pseudonym that referred to Publius Valerius Publicola, a defender of the
ancient Roman Republic.
See, e.g., MARTIN DIAMOND, THE
FEDERALISTS, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 573 (Leo Strauss
& Joseph Cropsey, eds., 1963)).
251
Justice Clarence Thomas summarizes relevant aspects of this history
in his concurrence in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission:
There is little doubt that the Framers engaged in
anonymous political writing. The essays in the Federalist
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development as a liberal democracy -- the right of publishers and
authors to remain anonymous has served as an important
component of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
of the press.252 Protecting the anonymity of publishers and authors
serves two fundamental speech-protective purposes: First,
protecting speakers’ anonymity allows the content of a speaker’s
Papers, published under the pseudonym of Publius, are only the
most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political
writing that occurred during the ratification of the Constitution. .
. . The earliest and most famous American experience with
freedom of the press, the 1735 Zenger trial, centered around
anonymous political pamphlets. The case involved a printer,
John Peter Zenger, who refused to reveal the anonymous authors
of published attacks on the Crown governor of New York.
When the governor and his council could not discover the
identity of the authors, they prosecuted Zenger himself for
seditious libel. See J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 9-19 (S. Katz ed.
1972). The case . . . signified at an early moment the extent to
which anonymity and the freedom of the press were intertwined
in the early American mind.
During the Revolutionary and Ratification periods, the
Framers' understanding of the relationship between anonymity
and freedom of the press became more explicit. In 1779, for
example, the Continental Congress attempted to discover the
identity of an anonymous article in the Pennsylvania Packet
signed by the name Leonidas. Leonidas, who actually was Dr.
Benjamin Rush, had attacked the members of Congress for
causing inflation throughout the States and for engaging in
embezzlement and fraud. 13 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 141 n. 1 (G. Gawalt & R. Gephart eds.
1986). Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massachusetts, moved to
haul the printer of the newspaper before Congress to answer
questions concerning Leonidas. Several members of Congress
then rose to oppose Gerry's motion on the ground that it invaded
the freedom of the press. D. Teeter, Press Freedom and the
Public Printing: Pennsylvania, 1775-83, 45 JOURNALISM Q.
445, 451 (1968).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 350 (1995).
252
See text accompanying notes 253-73.
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message to be evaluated on its merits instead of in the context of
the identity or reputation of the author.253
Second, and
concomitantly, protecting speakers’ anonymity allows proponents
of unpopular positions or causes to express their views without
fear of personal reprisal.254 As such, the protection of anonymous
speech is critical to fulfilling the countermajoritarian function of
the First Amendment by insulating speakers of unpopular
messages from the potential threat of reprisal. As the Supreme
Court explained in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,255
drawing from the theory of free speech protection set forth by John
Stuart Mill in ON LIBERTY256:
Anonymous speech is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but
an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent. Anonymity is
a shield from tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment
in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation
– and their ideas from suppression – at the hand of an
intolerant society.257
If a speaker’s anonymity were not protected, advocates of
unpopular ideas would often be dissuaded from speaking, thereby
impoverishing the marketplace of ideas. As Justice Hugo Black
explained Talley v. California,258 “persecuted groups and sects
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize
253
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(1996).
254
See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 374; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64
(1960); Tien, supra note 253, at 144 (observing that “one obvious cost of
regulating anonymity is potential retaliation against the speaker.”)
255
514 U.S. 334 (1995).
256
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
257
514 U.S. at 347.
258
362 U.S. 60 (1960).

Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance
259

oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”
The protection for anonymous speech is thus a critical component
of an expressive public forum in which individuals can share their
opinions with others free of personal reprisal, and have their
opinions be evaluated on their own merits. As Robert Post
contends, First Amendment jurisprudence reflects an affirmative
preference for anonymous speech in the public sphere, to allow
speakers to “divorce their speech from the social contextualization
that knowledge of their identities would necessarily create in the
minds of their audience.”260
Although the justifications for protecting anonymous
speech are arguably strongest with respect to political speech, the
First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech extend
beyond highly-valued political speech to other types of speech as
well. As the Supreme Court explained in McIntyre:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, and even books
have played an important role in the progress of mankind. .
. . The author’s decision in favor of anonymity may be
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible. Whatever
the motivation may be, . . . the interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring
disclosure as a condition of entry.
Accordingly, an
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content
of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech
259

362 U.S. at 64. See Tien, supra note 253, at 128-29 (explaining that
McIntyre is about “fear of viewpoint discrimination, because anonymity
is historically tied to the ability of the unpopular and persecuted to
criticize oppressive practices and laws.”)
260
See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse,
103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990). See also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight,
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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protected by the First Amendment.

Anonymity thus protects an author’s prerogative in defining how
to present her ideas to the world. As such, anonymity “safeguards
the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to
any concept of liberty.”262
Notwithstanding the importance of protecting anonymous
expression, legislatures over the centuries have attempted to erode
this protection and compel the disclosure of the speakers’ and
publishers’ identities in the name of various countervailing
interests.263 For example, in McIntyre, the legislature sought to
justify a prohibition on the anonymous distribution of campaign
literature on the grounds, inter alia, that compelling disclosure of
speakers’ identities was necessary to prevent fraud and libel.264
While recognizing the importance of such state interests, the
Supreme Court found that the state had sufficient means of directly
protecting against fraud and libel in the relevant contexts, and that
the state’s ban on anonymous campaign literature was an indirect
and insufficiently narrowly tailored means of advancing these
important state interests.265 While the state’s interest in preventing
fraud and libel might justify a more limited disclosure
requirement,266 the Supreme Court found that State’s total ban on
anonymous pamphleteering was unjustified.267
Similarly, in the recently-decided case of Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton,268 the
Supreme Court rejected the locality’s justification for mandating
disclosure of the identity and affiliation of door-to-door
canvassers. In Watchtower, the Village of Stratton, Ohio,
attempted to justify this disclosure requirement, inter alia, on the
261
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grounds of preventing fraud and crime. The Supreme Court found
that the complete ban on anonymous door-to-door canvassing that
the regulation effected – which applied not only to commercial
transactions and to the solicitation of funds, but also to religious
and political canvassers and others seeking to enlist support for
their causes – was insufficiently narrowly tailored to advance the
locality’s important interests. Accordingly, the locality’s total ban
on anonymous door-to-door canvassing was found to be
unjustified and its mandatory disclosure requirement for door-todoor canvassers was invalidated.269
The First Amendment right to speak anonymously has also
been specifically recognized in the context of Internet
communications.270 In a case that involved the right to speak
anonymously in the specific context of Internet communications,
the State of Georgia was found to have run afoul of the First
Amendment in attempting to prohibit all anonymous and
pseudonymous Internet communications. In Zell v. Miller,271
Georgia made it a crime falsely to identify one’s name (and hence
to communicate pseudonymously or anonymously) for the purpose
of electronically transmitting data, such as via email. Relying
upon McIntyre, the court struck down this statute, holding that it
impermissibly burdened the constitutional “right to communicate
anonymously and pseudonymously over the Internet.”272 While
crediting the state’s compelling interest in preventing fraud in
269
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See Zell v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997); American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (1996)
(recognizing importance of online anonymity to speakers who seek
access to sensitive information), aff’d, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). See also
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Internet communications, the court nevertheless found that the
statute’s blanket prohibition on anonymous and pseudonymous
Internet communications was not narrowly tailored to advance this
compelling state interest.
Because of the important role anonymous speech serves
within expressive forums – which in turn are integral to democratic
governments -- ICANN should, in re-evaluating its policies to
accord meaningful protection for freedom of expression, revise its
policy requiring domain name holders publicly to disclose their
names and addresses. While protecting anonymous Internet
speech is clearly an important component of free speech within the
United States, it is arguably even more important for ICANN to
protect the identity of speakers from countries that are more
inclined to retaliate against speakers based on the ideas they
express. In its brief history, the Internet’s role in facilitating
anonymous speech, through the use of encryption and related
technologies, has been critical to enabling speakers from foreign
countries to express themselves without fear of reprisal.274 In
embodying meaningful protection for the substantive democratic
value of freedom of expression while advancing its other important
interests, ICANN should accord as much protection as possible for
anonymous Internet speech. In reformulating its WHOIS policy,
ICANN should conform its policymaking to the general principle
of First Amendment jurisprudence requiring it to articulate an
important interest that it seeks to advance by this policy and
formulate the policy such that it restricts the least amount of
speech possible consistent with the advancement of this interest.275
Below I provide some suggestions as to how ICANN could
conform its policymaking to this general First Amendment
principle.
As is typical of efforts to compel disclosure of speakers’
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identities,
ICANN’s mandatory disclosure requirement flows
out of legitimate (and perhaps even compelling) interests – the
interest in facilitating intellectual property owners’ policing of
infringing use of their intellectual property on the Internet.277
Intellectual property owners lobbied, and have continued to lobby,
for a mandatory policy requiring disclosure and publication of
website owners’ names, addresses, and other personal contact
information because such disclosure and publication would
facilitate the policing and apprehension of alleged infringers.278 If
a copyright or trademark owner believes that a website infringes
her content, for example, under ICANN’s current policy, she can
simply query the WHOIS database to discern the name and address
of the individual responsible for such content,279 and commence
steps to seek a judicial order requiring such infringing content to
be removed. Yet, as with other efforts to require disclosure of the
identity of speakers that are motivated by important interests,
ICANN’s policy is insufficiently protective of Internet users’ free
speech rights and should be revised to render it more carefully
tailored to advancing the important interest of facilitating the
policing of infringing conduct while restricting the least amount of
speech possible.
There are several ways in which ICANN could render its
WHOIS policy more speech-protective while still advancing the
interest of policing infringing content on the Internet. First,
ICANN could require that those interested in registering a domain
name and maintaining a website merely provide their e-mail
address – instead of their name and (physical) address – to their
276

See text accompanying notes 264-73.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 31,744. ICANN’s Domain
Name Supporting Organization’s Intellectual Property Constituency, for
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Related to WHOIS, DNSO Intellectual Property Constituency, at
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domain name registrar. The registrant’s email address would
provide a pseudonymous form behind which the speaker could
shield her identity if she so chose, but would still provide a point
of contact for each domain name registrant. Thus, instead of
requiring the domain name registrant of GEORGEWBUSH-IS-AMURDERER.COM or SADDAM-IS-A-MURDERER.COM to reveal to the
public his or her true identity, ICANN could merely require that
the domain name registrant provide a valid email address by way
of contact information. Requiring only an e-mail address as
contact information would serve the purpose of enabling
intellectual property owners (or others who believe their rights
were infringed) to contact the domain name registrant and
undertake initial steps (such as sending a cease and desist notice)
to inform the registrant of the allegation of infringement.280
Under this email-only scenario, if a rights holder alleged
that his or her intellectual property rights were being infringed by a
domain name holder -- about which the only information readily
available was an email address -- the rights holder would still have
several powerful remedies readily available to her. A copyright
owner who claims that her rights were infringed by the content on
a particular website could bring an action under Section 512 of the
Copyright Act,281 through which she could essentially compel the
280

Email addresses would also serve as sufficient contact information for
other purposes, such as if the domain name registrar needed to inform the
domain name registrant of a proposed change in the terms of the
agreement, or if another individual or entity interested in purchasing the
rights to the domain name wished to contact the domain name holder.
281
17 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512’s notice and take down provisions
allow an owner of a copyrighted work who believes her work is
infringed by the content on a website to request the Internet Service
Provider (ISP) hosting the website to take down the material. The ISP
must take down the allegedly infringing material in order to avoid being
held directly, contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright
infringement based on hosting (or linking to) the allegedly infringing
content. When complaining of the infringement to the ISP, the copyright
owner need not identify the infringing party. Rather, it suffices under the
statutory scheme for her to “identify the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be
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Internet Service Provider hosting the allegedly infringing content
to take it down – without needing to know the identity of the
alleged infringer.282 Similarly, a trademark owner who alleges that
a domain name holder is infringing her trademark could bring an
action under ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy283 or
under the in rem provisions of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act284 to have the allegedly infringing domain name
cancelled or transferred, again without needing to know the true
identity of the domain name registrant.
It might be objected that access to mere email addresses
insufficiently accommodates the intellectual property owner or
other rights holder who wishes to sue a domain name holder for
violating her intellectual property or other rights, and that
ICANN’s current policy requiring public access to domain name
holders’ names and addresses is necessary to facilitate such
interests. There are, however, several possibilities short of
ICANN’s current mandatory disclosure and publication policy that
would accommodate the interests of rights holders while still being
more protective of free speech. ICANN could, for example,
require that domain name registrants provide to their domain name
registrar their email address as well as their name and physical
address, but only allow (or require) registrars to publish the
domain name holders’ email address. Under this scenario, the
domain name registrar would maintain (1) a publicly searchable
database correlating domain names with email addresses of
domain name holders, and (2) a confidential database correlating
domain names with names and addresses of domain name holders
that would only be accessible upon a heightened showing. Upon a
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.” 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). Section 512 also provides a mechanism for
the copyright owner to secure a subpoena to order the ISP to disclose the
identity of the alleged direct infringer. See § 512(i).
282
See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
283
See supra Part II(C).
284
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (setting forth circumstances under
which a trademark owner can bring an in rem action against a domain
name itself).
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proper heightened showing by a rights holder – such as, at a
minimum, filing a legitimate complaint against a domain name
holder and providing a copy of the same to the domain name
registrar – the domain name registrar could then be required to
reveal the identity of the domain name registrant to the rights
holder for purposes of the latter’s prosecuting the lawsuit only.
United States courts’ recent efforts to balance Internet
users’ right to communicate anonymously against other
individuals’ property, reputational, and privacy rights are
instructive for ICANN in reworking this policy to achieve a
balance between the rights of Internet users to speak and publish
anonymously and other rights holders’ interests. In a series of
recent cases in which plaintiffs alleged that they were defamed by
anonymous postings to web-based forums and sought to discover
the identities of the individuals responsible for such postings from
the relevant Internet Service Providers, courts have imposed
stringent requirements on plaintiffs’ efforts to discover the
identities of such individuals.
For example, in Doe v.
285
2TheMart.com, the plaintiff, who claimed that she was defamed
by an anonymous post, sought to discover from the ISP the identity
of an alleged defamatory poster. The court looked critically at
plaintiff’s allegations of defamation and imposed stringent
standards on plaintiff’s ability to discover the poster’s identity, in
order to protect the poster’s right to engage in anonymous speech.
Holding that “discovery requests seeking to identify anonymous
Internet users must be subject to careful scrutiny by the courts,”286
the court set forth a multifactor test287 for evaluating whether
plaintiff’s need for such information outweighed the poster’s right
285
286
287

140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001),
Id. at 1092.

Id. Under this four part test, the court will inquire into the following
factors in considering whether a subpoena for the identity of non-party
Internet speakers should be upheld: “(1) Was the subpoena brought in
good faith? (2) Does the information relate to a core claim or defense?
(3) Is the identifying information directly and materially relevant to that
claim or defense? (4) Is the information available from other sources?”
Id. at 1092.
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to speak anonymously.
Only upon satisfying this heightened
showing would plaintiff’s right to access such information in order
to prosecute her defamation action be found to outweigh
defendant’s right to speak anonymously.288 Courts have imposed
close scrutiny in several other recent cases on requests to discover
the identity of individuals who allegedly violated plaintiffs’
rights.289
In short, American free speech jurisprudence has for
centuries recognized the importance of protecting speakers’
anonymity as an integral component of the right to freedom of
expression. Such jurisprudence is illuminative for ICANN in
revising its policies for acquiring domain names (and hence
websites) to render them less restrictive of speech, while still
advancing ICANN’s interest in facilitating the policing of
infringement.
C. Embodying the Right to Freedom of Expression within ICANN’s
Policy-Making: Lessons from First Amendment Protections for
Critical Speech
American First Amendment jurisprudence also provides
helpful guidance for ICANN regarding the protection of critical
speech within the context of intellectual property law. An
important function of intellectual property law in liberal
democracies is to prevent intellectual property owners from
exercising full monopoly control over components of the common
language or culture, in particular in cases of criticism leveled
against such intellectual property owners.290 The United States
government has long wrestled not only with protection for free
expression in general but also with such protection within the
context of intellectual property law -- and as against competing
claims by intellectual property owners. Accordingly, United
288

Id.
See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe, 342 N.J. Super 134 (App. Div.
2001); Global Telemedia Int’l v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C. D. Cal.
2001).
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See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright
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States intellectual property law reflects a nuanced working out of
the ways in which free speech values are protected against
overreaching by intellectual property owners.
Several important branches of intellectual property law,
including copyright law291 and trademark law,292 impose
substantial limitations on intellectual property owners’ exclusive
monopoly rights in their intellectual property in order to advance
free speech values.293 Recognizing the dangers to free speech
implicit in granting intellectual property owners unlimited
monopoly rights over components of our shared language and
culture, U.S. copyright and trademark law reflects a balance of
competing intellectual property rights and free speech rights.
Indeed, both the federal copyright and trademark statutes provide
explicit exceptions to their coverage for uses of copyrighted works
and trademarks that are in the nature of criticism, commentary, and
other bona fide expression.294 Because ICANN’s policy-making
primarily affects trademark and cognate branches of intellectual
property, I focus below on guidance that United States trademark
jurisprudence provides in according special protections for
freedom of expression.
291

See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (copyright law's idea/expression dichotomy "strike[s] a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright
Act by permitting free communication of facts [and ideas] while still
protecting an author's expression.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2001).
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See text accompanying notes 303-85.
See, e.g., Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech:
First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK
REP. 48 (1997) (comparing First Amendment limitations on copyright
and trademark holders’ rights).
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See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(c) (providing exception from coverage of
federal trademark causes of action for “all forms of news reporting and
commentary”); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (including “criticism” and “comment”
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U.S. trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act
and
under various state statutes,296 provides trademark owners with the
limited exclusive right to use their marks (such as “McDonalds” or
“Barbie”) in commerce to designate the source or origin of their
products or services. The Lanham Act, along with various state
statutes, provide trademark owners with a cause of action for
trademark infringement against one who uses their trademark in
commerce to designate source or origin or where such use is likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive as to affiliation or
sponsorship.297 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act,298 as well as
various state anti-dilution statutes,299 further provide to owners of
marks the right to prevent the dilution of their marks – i.e., the
reduction of their marks’ capacity to identify and distinguish their
goods or services – via tarnishment300 or blurring301 (such as the
use of the mark “Barbie” in connection with a pornographic
website).
Finally, the recently-enacted Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act302 provides to owners of marks the right
to prevent the bad faith use of a domain name that is identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the owner’s mark.
The First Amendment requires that trademark owners’
rights in their marks not extend to silence others’ speech that is
expressive,303 so long as such speech is not likely to cause
confusion as to source and is not dilutive of the mark’s
identificatory power. In many cases in which trademark interests
have been pitted against free speech interests, courts have properly
held that the extension of trademark infringement and/or dilution
law to silence use of a trademark for expressive or communicative
purposes such as criticism, commentary, parody, or satire, is
295
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violative of the right to free speech embodied in the First
Amendment.304 Furthermore, in the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act – which was enacted to address the same conflicts
between trademark owners and domain name owners as ICANN’s
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy – Congress and the courts
clearly recognized that Internet users’ free speech rights impose
significant limitations on overreaching by trademark owners in this
context.305 Over the years, as trademark owners have sought to
wield their trademarks to silence criticism directed at them or other
unwelcome use of their marks, courts have construed the First
Amendment to protect such speech against trademark
infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting claims.306 Although
free speech interests have not always prevailed over trademark
interests in such cases,307 the First Amendment has nonetheless
served as a powerful check on trademark owners’ monopoly rights
over expressive speech incorporating their marks.
The cause of action for trademark infringement per se, as
distinct from trademark dilution, has often been unavailing to
trademark owners in their attempts to silence expressive uses of
their marks. Where another entity makes use of a plaintiff’s
trademark for truly expressive or communicative purposes,
plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing a key element of
trademark infringement -- the likelihood of confusion as to
plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement of such speech.308 In many
cases in which defendants used plaintiffs’ marks to communicate a
message – including but not limited to messages that are critical of
plaintiffs – courts have held that the trademark owner failed to
meet its burden of establishing likelihood of confusion,309 and have
304
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308
See Cantwell, supra note 293, at 57 (observing that “a separate First
Amendment defense to an infringement claim will generally not be
necessary to protect expressive speech so long as courts objectively
analyze the likelihood of confusion issues.”)
309
See text accompanying notes 311-15.
305

Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance
100
accordingly found it unnecessary to rely upon the First
Amendment in order to protect defendants’ expressive use.310 The
Reddy Kilowatt311 case is instructive on this point. In that case, the
trademark owner of the cartoon character Reddy Kilowatt, which
was used as a promotional device for electrical utilities, sued an
environmental organization that had fashioned a mocking
caricature of the cartoon character in order to criticize the
electrical utilities’ policies in its mailings. Upon holding that there
was no likelihood of confusion between defendant’s use and
plaintiff, the court threw out plaintiff’s trademark infringement
action. Because plaintiff could not show likelihood of confusion,
defendant’s First Amendment defense to trademark infringement
was irrelevant.312 The court’s analysis of defendant’s First
Amendment defense was therefore unnecessary, because no
likelihood of confusion was found in the first place.313 In a similar
case, a court held that the United States government’s exclusive
rights in the name and character “Smokey Bear” must yield to
permit an environmental group to sponsor an advertisement
involving the use of Smokey to criticize the U.S. Forest Service’s

310

See generally Cantwell, supra note 293, at 49 (“In theory, limiting
recovery to confusing uses of a trademark would seem to adequately
protect free speech interests, for the First Amendment has no stake in the
spread of misleading information.); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165 (where
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark is deceptive or misleading, First
Amendment provides no defense to claim of trademark infringement and
accordingly “traditional trademark theory, with is reliance on the
confusion rationale, poses no threat to freedom of expression.”)
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Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Foundation,
477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979).
312
The Reddy court in fact looked unfavorably upon defendant’s First
Amendment defense, finding that defendant had adequate alternative
means to convey its message criticizing plaintiff other than by using
plaintiff’s mark. 477 F. Supp. at 938. See text accompanying notes 31623.
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logging policies.
The advertisement, in which Smokey appeared
trying to hide a chainsaw behind his back, was captioned “Say it
ain’t so, Smokey.” The court held that the use of Smokey Bear in
this critical context would be unlikely to cause confusion, and
constituted “a form of criticism of government policies on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”315
Accordingly, the court found that the statute granting the United
States government the exclusive right to use the name and
character of Smokey Bear was unconstitutional as applied to
enjoin the environmental organization’s noncommercial use of
Smokey Bear.
In both the Reddy Kilowatt and Smokey Bear cases,
plaintiffs were unable to prevail in trademark infringement and
cognate actions against defendants who used their marks to
criticize plaintiffs because the use of plaintiffs’ mark in these cases
was a uniquely powerful vehicle for criticizing plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the critical nature of such use served to dispel
confusion as to whether plaintiff sponsored such use. Where
defendants have sought to use plaintiffs’ marks for expressive
purposes unrelated to criticizing plaintiffs, courts have been less
sympathetic to defendants’ free speech claims. For example, in the
Mutant of Omaha case, defendant sought to use the above
variation of plaintiff’s mark “Mutual of Omaha” on T-shirts and
other products to express his views about nuclear weapons. The
court held that defendant enjoyed no First Amendment right to
enlist plaintiff’s trademark in the service of his opposition to
nuclear weapons, explaining that defendant enjoyed adequate
alternative means (beyond using plaintiff’s trademark) of
conveying his message.316
314

Lighthawk Envir. Air Force v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D.
Wash. 1993). This case, however, involved not the Lanham Act but a
federal statute granting the United States government the exclusive right
to use the name and character of Smokey Bear. The court found that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to enjoin the environmental
organization’s noncommercial use of Smokey Bear.
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This adequate alternative means of communication test,
borrowed from cases involving real property/free speech
conflicts,317 has been employed by the Mutant of Omaha and other
courts in evaluating plaintiffs’ trademark interests against
defendants’ free speech interests in a way that has generally
favored trademark interests.318 It is hard for a defendant to
establish that no adequate alternative means exist to express his
message other than by using plaintiff’s trademark in general, but
especially in cases where defendant is not using plaintiff’s mark to
express an opinion about plaintiff but is rather co-opting the
expressive power of plaintiff’s mark to express views on an
unrelated matter. The underprotective nature of this test has led
some courts, including the Second Circuit, to abandon its use in
adjudicating trademark/free speech conflicts, and to adopt more
speech-friendly balancing tests.319 For example, in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, discussed in greater detail infra,320 Ginger Rogers sued
to enjoin the use of her name in the title of Federico Fellini’s film
“Ginger and Fred.”321 Rogers argued that because Fellini had
adequate alternative means to express his artistic message other
than using Rogers’ name within his film title, Fellini’s First
Amendment defense to her trademark infringement claim should
fail. The Second Circuit took this opportunity to reject the
adequate alternative avenues of expression test (which it had
earlier adopted), explaining that “the ‘no alternative avenues’ test
does not sufficiently accommodate the public’s interest in free
expression.”322 In its stead, the court adopted a balancing test
F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
317
See Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that individuals
did not enjoy a First Amendment right to engage in political expression
within privately-owned shopping mall, because these speakers enjoyed
adequate alternative avenues for communicating their message).
318
See, e.g., Cantwell, supra note 293, at 56 (criticizing adequate
alternative means of communication test as insufficiently protective of
free speech).
319
See Cantwell, supra note 293, at 62 & n.70.
320
See text accompanying notes 374-79.
321
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322
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whereby plaintiff’s trademark interest would prevail “only where
the public interest in avoiding commercial confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.”323
The recently federally enshrined cause of action for
trademark dilution has strengthened trademark owners’ rights
against those using their marks for expressive purposes, because
no showing of likelihood of confusion is necessary under a dilution
cause of action.324 Well over half the states provide anti-dilution
statutes,325 and with the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act in 1995,326 trademark owners were granted additional rights
under the Lanham Act, including the right to protect their famous
marks against another’s use that tarnishes or dilutes the ability of
the mark to identify and distinguish plaintiff’s goods and
services.327 With protection against trademark dilution comes the
increased opportunity for trademark owners to wield their
trademark rights in ways that would impact free speech interests.
In particular, trademark owners have sought to establish that the
critical or otherwise unwelcome use of their marks tarnishes the
value of their marks and thereby constitutes actionable dilution.
As Roger Denicola explains, the tarnishment prong of trademark
dilution constitutes “an open-ended invitation to restrict any use
that undermines the commercial value or appeal of the trademark”
and therefore more severely threatens free speech values.328
323
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In the eight years since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
has been passed, courts have struggled with how to balance
trademark owners’ additional anti-dilution rights against the free
speech interests of those using their marks for expressive purposes.
Although free speech interests fare less well in trademark dilution
causes of action than in trademark infringement causes of
action,329 the First Amendment nonetheless imposes substantial
limitations on trademark owners’ anti-dilution rights.
The case of L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers330 is illustrative
of a trademark owner’s attempts to wield infringement and dilution
causes of action to silence expressive speech incorporating its
trademark. In that case, High Society, a commercial, adultoriented magazine, published an article parodying the popular L.L.
Bean sportswear catalog, under the title “L.L. Beam’s Back-toSchool-Sex-Catalog.” The content of the article, like the article’s
title, included variations on L.L. Bean’s trademarks and featured
pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using
products similar to those offered in L.L. Bean catalogs and
described in a “crudely humorous fashion.”331 L.L. Bean, not
amused, sued the publisher of High Society for trademark
infringement and dilution. Consistent with the above analysis of
trademark infringement, the district court readily found that the
article engendered no real likelihood of confusion, and dismissed
Bean’s cause of action for trademark infringement.332 The district
court, however, sustained Bean’s cause of action for trademark
dilution, finding that High Society’s parodic use of the L.L. Bean
mark within this context diluted the mark’s distinctive qualities,333
and accordingly enjoined publication of the article.334
High Society appealed, claiming that the district court’s
order enjoining publication of the article violated its right to
329
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freedom of expression. The First Circuit agreed, explaining that:
Trademarks, and in particular famous trademarks, offer a
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of
their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at
times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary. Rules
restricting the use of well-known trademarks may therefore
restrict the communication of ideas . . . . The constitutional
implications of extending the trademark infringement,
misappropriation or tarnishment rationales to cases in
which defendant’s speech is particularly unflattering may
often be intolerable. Since a trademark may frequently be
the most effective means of focusing attention on the
trademark owner or its product, the recognition of
exclusive rights encompassing such use would permit the
stifling of unwelcome discussion.335
The First Circuit concluded that while the Constitution tolerates
incidental impacts on free speech where necessary to prevent a
defendant from merchandising its products by using another’s
mark, the First Amendment prohibits the extension of a trademark
owner’s monopoly to enjoin the non-confusing, expressive – albeit
critical -- use of another’s trademark, whether under trademark
infringement or dilution causes of action.
The case of Mattel v. MCA Records336 further illuminates
the contours of First Amendment protection for speech that
incorporates another’s trademark as against claims of trademark
infringement and dilution. In that case, Mattel, the owner of the
famous mark “Barbie,” brought a trademark dilution action against
the music group Acqua to enjoin the release of the song Barbie
Girl, which referred to Barbie as a “blond bimbo girl” who “loves
to party” and whose “life is plastic.”337 Mattel claimed both that
Acqua’s use of the song title “Barbie Girl” and associated lyrics
incorporating its famous mark constituted trademark infringement
by creating a likelihood of confusion as to Mattel’s sponsorship of
335
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the song, and that such use constituted actionable trademark
dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act because it
disparaged Barbie’s otherwise wholesome image. In ruling on
plaintiff’s trademark infringement and dilution causes of action,
the Mattel court found that the First Amendment provided a
defense to both, and refused to enjoin the song’s release.338
The Mattel court first explained that a trademark owner’s
rights are limited to the use of its mark “for the identification of
the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider or a
service.”339 Trademark rights, being limited property rights in
particular words, phrases, or symbols, “do not allow trademark
holders to censor or silence all discussion of their products that
they find annoying or offensive.”340 Observing that plaintiff’s
attempt to wield its trademark rights to enjoin the expressive use of
its mark would implicate the right to freedom of expression, the
court concluded that “to deny the opportunity to poke fun at the
symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of
our daily life would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected
form of expression.”341 The court considered plaintiff’s evidence
of likelihood of confusion, but concluded that “the First
Amendment interests at stake outweigh the possibility that some
people might not interpret the song’s lighthearted lyrics as a
comment or spoof on the popular Mattel product and might be
confused as to whether Mattel put out or authorized the song.”342
Turning to plaintiff’s trademark dilution claim, the Mattel
court held that even if the song could be said to tarnish or dilute
the Barbie mark and even though the song was commercially
released for profit, defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark was “noncommercial” and therefore protected under the “noncommercial
use of a mark”343 exception to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
Even though defendant’s use of the mark was in the larger context
338
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of a commercial, for-profit work, because the specific context in
which the use was made was expressive, it was nonetheless
protected speech under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The
Mattel court’s analysis demonstrates the important distinction
drawn by the FTDA between noncommercial uses of another’s
mark, which are not actionable under the FTDA, and commercial
uses of another’s mark, which are actionable under the FTDA.
In conclusion, the Mattel court refused to “apply antidilution statutes to permit a trademark owner to enjoin the use of
his mark . . . simply because [he or she] finds such use negative or
offensive. [Otherwise], a corporation could shield itself from
criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical
of its conduct, with detrimental consequences to free speech in this
society.”344
To be sure, courts have not unilaterally ruled in favor of
free speech interests in every case in which such interests are
pitted against trademark holders’ anti-dilution rights, whether
under state or federal statutes.345 And because federal protection
against dilution is less than one decade old, courts have not yet had
a full opportunity to develop a thoughtful balancing of free speech
interests against such trademark interests. A mature trademark
dilution jurisprudence would accord trademark owners meaningful
rights against dilution of their marks while restricting the least
amount of bona fide expression possible. While the First
Amendment should not be understood to serve as a trump card for
defendants in trademark dilution causes of action, it has and should
continue to impose on courts the duty to grant meaningful
consideration to defendants’ assertions that their expression
incorporating plaintiffs’ marks, even if critical of plaintiffs, is
worthy of protection.
Along with emphasizing the importance of imposing free
speech limitations on trademark owners’ anti-dilution rights, the
344
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Mattel and L.L. Bean cases also demonstrate that the commercial
or for-profit character or context of speech is not a bar to a holding
that such speech is protected under the First Amendment. In the
L.L. Bean case, for example, the court emphasized that, despite the
fact that defendant engaged in its speech for profit in the context of
a commercial periodical, “such speech nonetheless constitutes
[protected] editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of
plaintiff’s mark, [because defendant] did not use Bean’s mark to
identify or promote goods or services to consumers.”346 Despite
the fact that the defendant in L.L. Bean engaged in use of
plaintiff’s mark in the larger context of a commercial enterprise,
defendant’s speech in that case was expressive and therefore
protected by the First Amendment.347 Similarly, the Mattel court
held that the overall commercial context in which defendant
embedded its expressive use of plaintiff’s mark did not reduce the
protection accorded to such use, because the specific context in
which the use was made was itself expressive.348 As the court
explained, “the fact that defendants’ product makes a profit or is
successful . . . does not affect the protections afforded to it by the
First Amendment.”349 The court went on to emphasize that speech
engaged in for profit is nonetheless protected by the First
Amendment: “The fact that expressive materials are sold neither
renders the speech unprotected nor alters the level of protection
under the First Amendment.”350 Significantly, free speech is
accorded its strongest protection when applied to such expressive
works as newspapers and periodicals, which are generally sold for
profit and contain commercial advertisements.351 The commercial
content of such materials in no way reduces the level of protection
accorded them, nor by itself moves them into the lower category of
“commercial speech” as that term is used within First Amendment
346
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jurisprudence.
In short, under U.S. First Amendment and trademark
jurisprudence, the use of another’s trademark for expressive
purposes is protected by the right to freedom of expression even
where such use is engaged in for-profit or is part of a larger
commercial enterprise,353 so long as defendant does not use
plaintiff’s mark as a source identifier in a manner that is likely to
cause confusion or that causes dilution of another’s mark.
The First Amendment right to freedom of expression also
specifically extends to the use of another’s trademark in the
context of domain names. Because domain names themselves, like
titles of traditional expressive works, can serve powerful
expressive functions, they constitute speech protectible by the First
Amendment. Indeed, Congress and the courts have expressly
recognized that domain names can constitute First Amendment
protected speech.354 In cases where trademark owners have
attempted to wield their intellectual property rights to enjoin the
expressive use of their marks within the context of domain names,
courts have recognized that domain names themselves can
constitute protected speech. Although, as above, defendants’ free
speech interests have not prevailed in every case,355 the First
Amendment imposes limitations on trademark owners’ rights
against domain name holders. For example, in the case of Bally
Total Fitness Holdings v. Faber,356 the court held that the First
Amendment protected the expressive use of a plaintiff’s trademark
incorporated in a domain name criticizing plaintiff.357 The domain
352
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name holder in that case, Andrew Faber, devoted a section of his
website – which he entitled “Bally Sucks” and which included
“Ballysucks” as part of its domain name – to criticizing the
practices of the popular Bally health club business.358 The “Bally
Sucks” section of the website contained the Bally logo and mark
with the word “sucks” printed across it and offered visitors the
opportunity to access (and contribute to) complaints about Bally’s
business.359 Bally sued for trademark infringement and dilution
based on Faber’s incorporation of its mark within his domain name
and within the content offered on the website itself. Faber asserted
a First Amendment right to express himself using plaintiff’s
mark.360
In ruling on Bally’s causes of action, the court first
explained on the trademark infringement claim that given the
clearly critical nature of the content on defendant’s website, there
was little likelihood of consumer confusion because “no
reasonably prudent Internet user would believe that a site
emblazoned with ‘Bally Sucks’ would be sponsored by or
affiliated with Bally.”361 Turning to Bally’s claim that defendant’s
use of the phrase “Bally sucks” constituted dilution actionable
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,362 the court refused to
358
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interpret the Act to allow plaintiff to enjoin critical use of its mark,
explaining that trademark owners may not invoke dilution law to
“quash unauthorized use of their mark by a person expressing a
point of view.”363
Similarly, courts weighing trademark owners’ intellectual
property rights and Internet users’ free speech rights in the context
of claims brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act have recognized that domain names can constitute
speech protected under the First Amendment. Consider, for
example, the Lucentsucks case, in which Lucent Technologies
brought an action under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection
Act
challenging
the
domain
name
364
LUCENTSUCKS.COM.
While holding that the trademark owner
failed to satisfy certain jurisdictional prerequisites, the court
explained that Lucent “could not make out a violation of trademark
rights [based on the registration and use of the domain name
LUCENTSUCKS.COM] without infringing defendant’s free speech
rights,” and noted that “a successful showing that
LUCENTSUCKS.COM is effective parody and/or a site for critical
commentary would seriously undermine the required elements for
the cause of action at issue in this case.”365 Other courts
construing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
cases where defendants asserted First Amendment rights have
reasoned that in order to secure protection under the First
Amendment, defendant’s domain name itself – and not merely the
speech available on the web site at issue – must be used for
plaintiff’s mark, it would not look to the diverse components and
features of defendant’s website, but would focus specifically on the
narrow context of defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark. Within this
specific context, the court held that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark
was noncommercial and fell within the noncommercial use exception to
the FTDA because such use was limited to defendant’s non-commercial
expressive criticism of the Bally health club business. Id. at 1164.
363
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364
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expressive and not misleading purposes.
Bally and similar cases367 therefore establish that domain
names, like other concise expressive phrases, can constitute speech
protected by the First Amendment. It is well-established as a
matter of First Amendment jurisprudence that brief phrases and
slogans used for expressive purposes – such as “Live Free or
Die,”368 “Fuck the Draft,”369 etc. – can constitute expressive
speech for purposes of First Amendment protection. Indeed, such
phrases and slogans may be all the more potent forms of
expression because of their concentrated nature. It is also wellestablished that the expressive use of another’s trademark within
the context of such brief phrases constitutes protected speech as
against trademark owner’s claims of infringement or dilution.370
Notably, many trademark cases involve successful First
Amendment defenses for the use of concise terms or expressions
analogous to domain names, such as those discussed above
involving protection for the song title “Barbie Girl” and the article
title “L.L. Beam’s Back to School Sex Catalog.”371
The protection accorded to titles of expressive works has
received nuanced treatment under the United States’ free speech
jurisprudence that is illuminative for the treatment of domain
names, which serve roles analogous to titles. In interpreting the
First Amendment as against conflicting claims by trademark
owners, courts have recognized that titles of expressive works, like
domain names, often serve the dual function of being expressive
themselves and serving the purpose of commercial promotion.372
Courts have held that the commercial component of such speech,
however, does not reduce the protection accorded them under the
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First Amendment.
The Second Circuit’s decision in the case of Rogers v.
Grimaldi374 helps to illuminate the hybrid nature of titles, and, by
analogy, of domain names. In that case, legendary dancer Ginger
Rogers claimed that Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini’s use of the
title “Ginger and Fred” created a likelihood of confusion as to
Ginger Rogers’ affiliation with the film, diluted the distinctive
character of her name, and thus constituted actionable trademark
infringement and dilution.375 Fellini asserted a First Amendment
defense, claiming that his use of this film title served expressive
purposes that outweighed any possible likelihood of confusion.376
In rejecting Rogers’ trademark claims, the Second Circuit found
that titles of expressive works are of a “hybrid nature,” in that they
can “combine artistic expression and commercial promotion.”377
The court explained that “although First Amendment concerns do
not insulate titles from Lanham Act claims, [First Amendment]
concerns must nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope
of the Lanham Act as applied to claims involving such titles.”378
Concomitantly, the court held that consumers of such expressive
works have dual interests: “an interest in not being misled and an
interest in enjoying the results of such expression. For all these
reasons, the expressive element of titles requires substantial
protection under the First Amendment.”379 Following the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Rogers v. Grimaldi, other courts, such as the
Mattel court,380 have recognized the important expressive role
served by titles, and have held that the First Amendment protects
defendants’ expressive use of trademarks within the title of
defendants’ work.
Like titles, domain names can serve both expressive and
373
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commercial promotion purposes that advance both the domain
name holders’ interest in free expression as well as Internet users’
interests in enjoying the results of such expression. When a
domain name incorporates another’s trademark solely for the
purpose of (misleading) commercial promotion, such use is
properly held to be unprotected by the First Amendment. Yet
when a domain name incorporates another’s trademark for an
expressive purpose, as in the Bally and Lucent cases discussed
above, such use is properly held to be protected by the First
Amendment. The case of Planned Parenthood v. Bucci381 is
illustrative of the first type of use of another’s trademark within a
domain name – use for the purpose of misleading promotion -which does not merit protection under the First Amendment. In
that case, an individual opposed to contraceptive and abortion
rights was the first to register the domain name
PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM. Upon visiting the home page of this
PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM site, visitors were greeted with the
message “Welcome to Planned Parenthood’s Home Page.”382 In
ruling on Planned Parenthood Foundation of America’s trademark
infringement cause of action challenging defendant’s use of this
domain name, the court held that such use of plaintiff’s trademark
as defendant’s domain name was not expressive, but was instead
for the purpose of trading on plaintiff’s mark to misleadingly
identify the web page at issue as originating from Planned
Parenthood. The court explained that defendant’s use of the
domain name PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM was unprotected by the
First Amendment because it “had no [expressive] implications, and
was being used to attract consumers by misleading them as to the
website’s source or content.”383 If the defendant in Planned
Parenthood had chosen a domain name that was expressive, but
not misleading as to source, such as CHOOSELIFE.COM,
ABORTIONKILLS.COM,
or
even
STOPABORTION.COM,
PLANNEDPARENTHOODKILLS.COM, he would have had a far stronger
argument that such a domain name itself was intended to
381
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communicate a message or idea and was therefore protected by the
First Amendment.384
In contrast to the Planned Parenthood case, the Bally case
discussed above exemplifies defendant’s use of plaintiff’s
trademark – viz., “Bally sucks” as part of defendant’s domain
name -- in a manner that is protected by the First Amendment.385
Because defendant’s use of this domain name served an expressive
purpose, and because no reasonably prudent person could be
confused by defendant’s use of “Bally sucks” within his domain
name, his use of plaintiff’s mark in the context of his domain name
constituted speech protected by the First Amendment.
In short, domain names – despite their concise nature – are
protectible speech under the First Amendment. The use of
another’s trademark within a domain name constitutes speech
protected by the First Amendment where such use is for expressive
purposes and is not confusing or dilutive of another’s mark. The
First Amendment plays a significant role in limiting trademark
owners’ monopoly over the words and symbols that make up their
marks and in protecting speech that incorporates others’
trademarks for expressive purposes. In the face of trademark
owners’ attempts to wield their rights under trademark
infringement, dilution, and now anticybersquatting law to silence
bona fide critical and other expressive uses of their marks, the First
Amendment imposes important protection against such
overreaching.
No similar checks exist on ICANN decision-making or on
384
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analogous ICANN policies. Neither ICANN’s foundational
documents, nor its Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, accord any
special weight to freedom of expression. Because of the public
ordering role ICANN serves in regulating speech within this
important expressive forum, ICANN must be called upon to
incorporate special protections for freedom of expression within its
foundational documents and to revise its Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy to ensure that it restricts the least amount of
speech possible while protecting trademark owners against the
confusing or dilutive use of their marks.
First, the Policy should be revised to incorporate a more
careful assessment of the commercial nature of the expression
available on challenged websites. In many disputes under the
Policy involving a domain name holder’s critical use of another’s
mark – such as the disputes involving BURLINGTON386
MURDERFACTORY.COM
and LAKAIXA.COM387 – the mere presence
of some commercial content on the challenged website effectively
defeated the domain name holder’s claim that he or she enjoyed
“rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name, and constituted
grounds for removal of the domain name. In order to establish
rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the Policy requires
that the domain name holder is “making a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the
trademark or service mark at issue.”388 Thus, even if the use of the
domain name could be considered “fair use” – whatever that is
held to mean in this context -- a showing that the domain name
holder has the intent “for commercial gain . . . to tarnish the [mark]
at issue” is fatal to the domain name holder’s ability to establish
her rights and legitimate interests in the mark. Because many
websites critical of trademark owners can be said to “tarnish the
mark at issue” and because many such websites include or link to
some commercial content on their site, the Policy – as written and
as applied – is insufficiently protective of domain name holders’
386
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right to engage in critical speech.
In particular, holding that the inclusion of some
commercial content (such as an advertisement for unrelated goods
or services) renders a domain name holder’s critical speech
unprotected burdens more speech than is necessary to advance
ICANN’s interests. As we have seen, free speech protection for
artistic, literary, and editorial works such as newspapers or
periodicals is rendered no less strong by the economic motive of
the speaker/publisher or the presence of advertisements contained
within such expressive works.389 Similarly, the mere presence of
an advertisement, commercial content, or economic motive should
not render a domain name holder’s critical use of another’s
trademark unprotected under the Policy. Despite the fact that such
advertisements provide revenue to the speaker involved, such
advertisements do not render the expressive content any less
expressive and should not render such content any less protected.
Accordingly, the presence of (or link to) commercial content on a
website should not reduce the protection accorded to a domain
name holder under the Policy. Rather, the appropriate inquiry
regarding domain name holders’ rights and legitimate interests
should be into whether the domain name holder is using the mark
at issue – in the context of the domain name and in the context of
the website generally – (1) for the purpose of confusing and
misleading consumers as to source or diluting the mark, or (2) for
the purpose of expressing her views, ideas or opinions, including
in a manner that is critical of the mark. If it is established that the
domain name holder is using the mark for expressive purposes –
as, for example, in the BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM case390
– such use should be protected under the Policy, notwithstanding
the presence of any commercial content on the website. Just as the
commercial nature of or content contained within the magazine in
the L.L. Bean case391 did not mitigate the level of protection
available for the publishers with respect to the critical use of L.L.
Bean’s mark, so too the presence of commercial content in
389
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conjunction with an expressive use of a trademark should not
reduce the free speech protections accorded to such use under the
Policy.392
Second, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy should be
revised to provide meaningful sanctions for the misuse of this
process by trademark owners. The UDRP, by its terms, was
intended to apply only to those disputes involving bad faith
cybersquatting in which domain name holders did not enjoy any
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue.393 As
shown above, however, trademark owners have extended the
UDRP well beyond this scope and have misused the process by
bringing UDRP actions against domain name holders in cases in
which domain name holders enjoyed rights and legitimate interests
in their domain names. The UDRP attempts to discourage such
bad faith complaints by empowering UDRP panelists to label such
conduct “reverse domain name hijacking.”394 However, the Policy
fails to attach any sanction whatsoever to such conduct and
therefore fails to disincent such conduct. In order to meaningfully
discourage bringing such bad faith complaints, the Policy should
be revised to attach meaningful monetary or legal consequences –
such as paying the domain name holders’ fees (if any)395 – to such
acts of domain name “hijacking.”
392
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In short, in revising its domain name policies to accord
meaningful protection for the fundamental right of freedom of
expression, ICANN should extend greater protections to Internet
users’ right to engage in anonymous and critical speech.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Over the past five years, ICANN has engaged in an
unprecedented experiment in global democratic decision-making
affecting the rights of Internet users worldwide. When it ceded
control over key elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to
ICANN, the United States was correct to insist that ICANN
commit to embodying the procedural normative ideals of liberal
democracy by incorporating representative decision-making
structures over an extended sphere and by facilitating deliberation
within its decision-making. ICANN should be held to these
normative commitments and should not be permitted to revise its
governance structure to retreat from these commitments.
Because it has become clear over the past five years that
ICANN’s decision-making affects speech within the most
powerful forum for expression ever created, however, it is not
sufficient for ICANN to embody the procedural norms of liberal
democracy. Rather, ICANN’s governance structure must be
revised to accord meaningful protections for the substantive norms
of liberal democracy – most importantly, protections for freedom
of expression. Freedom of expression – whether justified on the
foundationalist grounds that it is intrinsically valuable or on the
instrumentalist grounds that it is necessary to a well-functioning
democratic system – is an essential component of liberal
democracies. ICANN’s governance structure should therefore be
revised to incorporate meaningful protections for freedom of
expression. In particular, ICANN should revise its speechregarding policies to accord meaningful protection for Internet
users’ right to engage in anonymous speech and their right to
engage in critical speech.

